

JPRS-EPS-84-115

17 September 1984

East Europe Report

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

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EAST EUROPE REPORT

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PROSPECTS FOR DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIALISM DEFINED

Warsaw KIERUNKI in Polish No 34, 19 Aug 84 p 3

[Article by Artur Bodnar: "Seen Through Marxist Eyes: New Problems of Socialism"]

[Text] The end of the twentieth century has created a series of new fundamental problems in the practical aspects of the development of socialism on a global scale. These problems have grown larger due to transformations in the nonsocialist world, the aggressive policy of American imperialism and the latest developments in the scientific and technical revolution in the West and its social and political consequences. These problems are also the product of the changes brought about by the development of a suitable social and material foundation for the states of real socialism as well as of the obsolescence of various forms of social organization and the need to create new mechanisms more suited to contemporary social needs.

The practical aspects of social and political life in socialist states made it necessary for the governing communist and worker parties to specify their Marxist-Leninist substance (as theory and ideology) and to develop programs of varying degrees of generality. In relation to practical needs, education and public mobilization, the ideas of these parties' programs have been conceived in such a comprehensive and directive form that they can be referred to as social and political doctrines. There are more or less specific concepts used to define the totality of social life at a given stage of development as well as the fundamental precepts for formulating tasks and methods for their implementation usually over a period of 2-3 five-year periods. This was true in the case of the decisions made by almost all of the communist and worker parties of the socialist community at the beginning of the 1970's when the ideological and theoretical framework of these decisions was the concept of the developed socialist society.

Therefore, the following theories were applied to the many different aspects of life in the socialist states: the theory of scientific and technical revolution

for material progress; the concept of the rapprochement of socialist forms of ownership for the sphere of property relations; the concept of decentralization and reform for economic management; and in relation to politics, strengthening of the party's leadership role with simultaneous increase of its control over other areas of social and political life (such as trade unions). The characteristic feature in this use of theory is that, in some states such as Poland and Romania, the party administration is closely tied to representative bodies and organs of social control. Finally, in creating an ideological image of society in the public awareness, the leading role of the working class in each of the societies in the states of the socialist community was no longer emphasized. The reasons for this were varied. This was, however, formally tied to the transformation of the dictatorship of the proletariat to a generally nationalized state. In conclusion, it is worth noting that the concept of developed socialism came into being during the detente period.

It must be pointed out that it was no new phenomenon that all of the communist and worker parties of the socialist community formulated a doctrine of developed socialism. From a historical point of view, we can make the following generalizations:

-- In the Soviet Union, the Russian Communist Party announced in 1934 the victory of socialism: that its foundations had been successfully created and that a socialist state was now built. This statement was then repeated in the 1936 constitution of the USSR. This assessment was guided by Marx's idea that the substance of a society's social and economic formation determines a society's proper method of production. This means that the method of production is determined by the ruling class and its eventual allies.

On the other hand, the true image of political relations and their institutions is, in this sense, the result of other factors, especially those of an objective and historical nature.

Let us recall that Marx was of the belief that the political transition from capitalism to socialism as a process of formation should be carried out through the agent of the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat. As opposed to Marx, Engels often used the term socialism and he saw the political structure of socialism as one universally based on the institution of autonomy. The dictatorship of the proletariat and universal autonomy as well as political pluralism within the proletariat and its allies was the chief concept of Marx and Engels for political organization of the new society. This concept, so brilliantly specified by Lenin was implemented in Soviet Russia in 1918-1922 and then cast aside, mainly due to the necessity of strengthening the besieged Soviet state. These facts are important because of their relevance to today's worker movement.

-- In 1944-48, the doctrine of the people's democracy as a social and political order came into being. The building of the foundations for socialism was

started at this time in nations liberated from nazi occupation. In the realm of property relations, the idea of a multisectoral society was used. In the case of some of the figures of that time, such as W. Gomulka, it was felt that popular democracy led by the parties of the working class would make it possible to forego the dictatorship of the proletariat as a political regime.

-- In 1956-57, the principles were formulated for the doctrine of building the foundations of socialism through the communist and worker parties convening at that time in Moscow. In this doctrine, the principles of social and economic structure were integrally connected with political government (dictatorship of the proletariat, leading role of the Marxist-Leninist party, the alliance of the working class and peasants, public ownership of the means of production, centralized leadership according to a state plan, etc.). This doctrine reflected Leninist concepts and was justified by the changes then being made in the socialist states (other than the USSR) in the period of 1948-1956. This doctrine remained in force until the end of the 1960's and formed the ideological and theoretical basis for specific policy programs of the governing communist and worker parties.

-- As we have said, the concept of developed socialism was part of the party ideological equipment in the states of the socialist community at the start of the 1970's (in the USSR, in 1967). In this case, each of the parties made a different assessment of the degree to which its country had advanced in shaping the right foundations for socialism, the extent to which it has completed this phase and its prospects for remaining in the phase of socialism preceding developed socialism. Due to external factors that this was done in each of these countries. At the same time, it was stated that stages of development might even overlap one another as a result of which the finalization for the proper goals in this phase of the building of the foundations of socialism is accompanied by realization of the goals of developed socialism. This was, in our opinion, a doctrine overlapping goals of the development of socialism.

At the present time, the view is being formulated that the phase of developed socialism is a long-term phase and that even the Soviet Union, which has permanently entered this phase of development, is also in its beginning stages.

-- We stated earlier that the formulation of a social and political doctrine of developed socialism originated during the detente period.

The detente period which reached its high point with the 1975 Helsinki agreement has had varied consequences. First of all, as early as 1973, it was felt in the USA that this policy did not accord with the interests of American imperialism even though there were no formal means of backing out of these agreements. The reason for this attitude was that the detente policy was undermining the USA's political and ideological leadership in the West, changing it to some degree no more than a strategic and military leadership. For this reason, the USA undertook a "human rights" campaign as an instrument of propaganda in the West and the governments of the socialist countries.

Second, the political dissension of the world socialist system broadened the field

of ideological criticism and the propaganda struggle over the states of the socialist community. Due to the needs of the ideological struggle, these states introduced the term "real socialism".

Third, the policy of detente opened new political perspectives for the communist and worker parties of Eastern Europe. However, the dissension of the world socialist system and the ideological struggle over real socialism started by right-wing circles in the West inclined many parties to analyze their identity against the historical background of their respective countries. This resulted in the formulation of the doctrine of so-called eurocommunism. In many ways, this doctrine was connected to the theoretical and ideological principles of K. Kautski and bore the banner of reformist ideology which is clearly used as an instrument of bourgeois propaganda.

In the 1970's, two opposite processes became distinguishable on both a global scale and within the two world social systems. On a global scale, these processes ranged from military and political detente to ideological confrontation (for example, human rights, eurocommunism and Chinese antisovietism) and the USA's initiation of a new arms race against the USSR and the nations of the socialist community. Furthermore, there emerged a series of new phenomena in the third world nations such as an increase in the number of socialist states and the involvement of the great powers in the affairs of the Near East and Middle East.

In the sphere of economics, these processes were the fuel and power crisis, technological rationalization of fuel and raw materials consumption and the beginning of a new technological revolution. These phenomena and others started a full-fledged crisis in the capitalist world. This crisis was accompanied by constant deterioration of the economic boom and the complication of trade which has, to the present day, produced difficulties in East-West economic relations.

In the realm of currency and finances, there was a surplus of oil products and eurodollars and extensive financing of modernization programs in socialist countries and in the oil-producing countries, for example, in order to break the oil and dollar surplus that was caused by price and currency value changes, the stabilization of oil prices and the USA's initiation of an "expensive dollar" policy and Western Europe's financing of the USA's budget deficit.

In employment and social affairs, the processes were full employment (except in the USA) and a high degree of social benefits to built-in unemployment and the limitation of the state's function as a protector and, as a consequence, pauperization of enormous masses of people. To counter growing public resentment, the bourgeois used the threat of rightist revolution (for example, in Great Britain), political terrorism, antisovietism and finally gave political power over to the hands of the conservative groups.

In North-South relations, the West took advantage of the international situation to politically weaken nonaligned nations and to create local confusion and wars.

In the 1970's, the socialist nations of Europe made efforts to modernize their technologies through the use of western credits, licenses and cooperative agreements. By the end of that decade, the socialist states were over 60 billion dollars in debt to the West. When detente failed and the economic crisis fell on the West, these credits and cooperative agreements could only in part fulfill their political function of creating a detente infrastructure and payment of the ensuing debts had a murderous effect on the socialist states' economies and standard of living which had by then become to some degree dependent upon these credits. In about the middle of the 1970's, the economic growth rate of these nations began to drop. The modernization policy and its more or less unforeseen results was destined to have a harmful effect upon the economic integration of the CEMA [Council for Economic Mutual Assistance] nations. Other circumstances discussed below also influenced CEMA's economic integration.

At the start of the 1970's, the governing parties in the nations of the socialist community declared that the extensive growth phase was completed and that there would now begin and intensify various forms of economic reform intended to stimulate a high tempo of technological revolution and growth in the socialist economies. In many nations, however, this never went beyond being anything more than a declaration. From this point of view, the 1970's can be seen as a decade of lost opportunities. It is, however, worth remembering that during this period, many important decisions on social policy were made in many countries (reduction of the work week and equalization of the social benefits of workers from different sectors of the economy, etc.).

The decade of the 1980's introduced a series of new phenomena and processes which were, however, a continuation of the processes from the second half of the 1970's. These processes will certainly continue to influence the international situation and the internal affairs of nations in both the socialist and capitalist communities through the middle of the 1990's. In the leading capitalist nations, the following processes have begun and continue to act:

-- In the USA, the far right wing has taken power and has been able to obtain enormous resources for new arms and to initiate an arms race in space. This was a new stage in the development of technological weaponry which was regarded both as a stimulus to further technological economic breakthrough following the era of microprocessors, robotization and full automation, which will undoubtedly be completed at the beginning of the next decade.

-- The technological revolution has also made itself felt in the consumption of fuel, raw materials and materials and reduced it in many cases. Along with the economic recession, this was brought about by the reversal of terms of trade and the unforeseen economic difficulties in the Third World.

-- The debts of the nations of the world to the banks of the northern hemisphere have reached 600 billion dollars. This is mainly the debts of the leading nations of the Third World. The surplus of eurodollars has disappeared. At the same time, the USA reinforced its "expensive dollar" policy and the financing of its deficit budget by highly-developed nations (especially

those of the European Common Market). We sometimes hear that a breakdown of the credit and finance system of the West (on the pattern of the Great Depression) would have unforeseen effects on imperialism and for that reason, the alternative can only be a worldwide armed conflict.

-- In the OECD countries, unemployment has reached a level of 30 million and continues to grow. The contemporary form of technological progress has also affected services which have therefore ceased to be a buffer for employment and social policy.

-- Under direct pressure from the United States, the West has begun to conduct an antisoviet crusade for which the Polish crisis and a psychotic fear of Soviet and communist aggression have been convenient pretexts. This crusade was fostered by the rhetoric of France's socialist president and British conservatives. Conflicts over states of socialist orientation are being used for this goal.

-- In the political sphere of the West, there have appeared new forces such as peace movements and alternative movements that are nonetheless tightly controlled by the governing bourgeois forces.

-- Two opposed processes have been observed on a global scale. One is the process of globalization of the actions of governments, the spread of international conflicts as a result of the increasing interdependency of the world's nations. The other is the fragmentation of international relations and therefore the emergence of various contradictions and conflicts in different parts of the world. This has made the existing political and military equilibrium very unstable. In the light of these facts, the Madrid document should be seen as a sign of the limitations placed on the USA's foreign policy in cases in which there come into play the interests of Western Europe as a whole and its relations with the USSR and the Warsaw Pact states. In essence, the German Federal Republic is suffering the greatest losses due to the policy of the United States.

In turn, among the nations of the socialist community, the 1980's began with the internal problems caused by the Polish crisis and the external problems caused by NATO's decision of so-called rearmament of Europe and the United States' initiation of a new stage in the development of technological weaponry. However, confining ourselves to the most general and urgent problems of real socialism, we can rank them as follows:

-- Passed beyond recall is the more than 30-year epoch of the development of socialism in Europe based on the concepts of "easy industrialization", almost unlimited access to Soviet raw materials and a surplus of labor forces. In economic terms, this concept was known as extensive growth and has found its proper support in the sphere of institutional political, legal and doctrinal decisions.

The extensive growth policy was associated, and often synonymous, with the policy of satisfying elementary consumer needs and price stabilization. This was accompanied by and continues to be accompanied by the delayed popular

demand for higher-quality products. The extensive growth policy of the 1970's was supported by easy access to western credits and the flow of complete supplies made possible by these credits.

Peculiar to this policy was the establishment of much stereotypical thinking on social security, labor laws and the state's obligations as a protector. In other words, it was felt that the state was omnipotent and that, together with the governing communist (or worker) party, it had unlimited responsibilities for all social affairs. This sort of thinking in Poland was reinforced by the command system of centralized control of the economy and public affairs, which excluded more or less developed ties between levels of administration and this led to dispersal of responsibility for the state of economic and social affairs of worker groups, local populations and regions.

In the development so far of the socialist state, the citizen has come to feel that he has lost responsibility for his own affairs and those of others. As a result, the society of real socialism has turned out for the most part to be unprepared for this stage of development, defined in economic terms as intensive development. Therefore, all of the disruption of the previous rules of economic and social control generally tend to produce conflicts since they contradict the citizen's economic and social interests and the stereotypes in which he views the world.

In conclusion, the real socialist state must undergo a rather long transition period in order to adapt society to the new conditions of growth with their characteristic and unprecedented limits on development. It is worth pointing out that if we survive this period without any conflicts, this will again show the value of real socialism in confrontation with capitalism and will then be the cause of a new wave of propaganda aggression by the West.

-- In view of limitations and new growth needs, the centers of planning in the socialist states are presently lacking resources to finance and restructure the economies. Extensive sources of internal reserves have become exhausted. At the same time, the possibilities for procurement of foreign capital have become unusually limited.

The economies of the socialist community's states are universally balanced by sector (except for Poland and, of course, Romania), although not in a piecemeal manner. The range and scale of allotment imbalances in recent years has sharply increased for reasons such as difficulties in trade with the West.

For the above reasons and others, deficits in production supplies are deepening but, on the other hand, there is also much wastage in the form of overconsumption of raw materials, semifinished products and fuel. The reports made by the CEMA Secretariat have all stressed that the mobilization of the member states for fulfillment of various parts of the present five-year plan is encountering many problems. The conditions for solving shortages of raw materials and energy are becoming complicated and expenses are increasing for the mining and transport of fuel and other raw materials.

At the same time, the states of real socialism have great internal growth

reserves whose use requires the adoption of many unorthodox political and economic decisions. The gradual assimilation of these reserves would make it possible to increase the growth rate (measured as the increment of growth in national income) by 2-4 percent every year over the next 10-15 years and perhaps even raise it again at the end of this period.

Several socialist community nations once again faced a broadening technological gap with the West. Once again, there are for the time being no suitable preconditions for judging whether these gaps can be covered with new purchases in the West. We must therefore search for solutions in the integration of scientific and technical efforts within CEMA. This does, however, require greater mutual openness between the member states and unorthodox decisions that could come into fruition only by the beginning of the 1990's.

-- In initiating the new stage of technological weaponry, the USA planned to reach three goals, namely: the achievement on its part of full military and political domination of the West; qualitatively new technological advantages; and to force the USSR to compete in arms production.

The United States is counting on the fact that, in order to meet this challenge, the USSR and its allies will have to divert enormous resources to arms technology and science at the expense of civilian needs and the standard of living. This is supposed to then impoverish the socialist countries. The process of reform to bring intensive sources of public accumulation, etc. would be hindered. In this way, the imperialist circles are figuring that social progress in the states of real socialism would then be frozen for a few decades or more.

The Soviet Union has fully taken up the challenges forced upon it by the USA.

-- The states of real socialism, above all the Soviet Union, have begun or are in the process of beginning to program and implement new policies in many areas, policy dictated both by the new conditions of development and by social needs.

First, in the area of manufacturing forces, electronics and complex automation are being developed. Efforts are being made to develop the production of new machines and technologies that are economical in terms of both power and material. These efforts are necessary because further economic growth is only possible for long periods only if the consumption of fuel and power per unit of national income can be reduced. Various projects are underway to make the deepest structural changes in the system of production. These projects are, however, encountering strong resistance on the part of subsector interest groups. These problems are all the more crucial since, both within the individual states and the entire socialist community, there has not yet been created any means in production for balancing out the consumer goods market.

Second, in the sphere of property relations and administration, it has been decreed that we must accelerate the assimilation of many concepts and experiments that have already been discussed for many years. In the realm of public ownership, there is a distinction made between the idea of general public (state) property and the idea of administering that property. In the process of resolving this distinction, the steering of economic proces-

ses by the instrument of trade and money is becoming developed. From the beginning of the 1930's, the various degrees of wholesale and retail price reform have been undertaken.

In all of the states of real socialism, the authority of worker councils and trade unions and their responsibility for production affairs has been expanded.

Third, the area of ratios of distribution is given key importance for the rationalization of management processes in the USSR and other CEMA nations. This area concerns labor and wage problems but also the range of real social benefits for both individuals and groups. The majority of the socialist community's states face an urgent need to deal with the contradictions between the shortage of labor and overemployment. The solution of these problems is a political matter above all.

Fourth, there must be, in the realm of politics, a search for methods of social mobilization. The organization of state authority and methods for its use by communist and worker parties is undergoing certain diverse modifications. This is connected with the need to increase the effectiveness of both the economic and political systems. Another factor is the change of generations. The generation that started its active professional life before or during World War II is leaving. The majority of the Polish population was born after 1945. These postwar generations have a different scale of experience and aspirations; they are the generations of peacetime oriented to a higher standard of living.

Fifth, in the sphere of ideological relations, efforts are being made to modernize educational processes and to deepen the general public's feeling of identification with the government and their perception of its value. This is fostered without contradiction by the doctrine of developed socialism whose critical outlook and creative elaboration is proclaimed by the leaders of the parties in the nations of the socialist community.

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HUNGARY

HORN RESPONDS TO MEDIA COVERAGE OF FOREIGN POLICIES

Budapest JEL KEP in Hungarian No 2, 1984 pp 5-9

[Interview with Gyula Horn, Director of the MSZMP CC Department of Foreign Affairs, by Istvan Wisinger, JEL KEP editor for Television: "Foreign Policy and the Mass Media"; date and place not specified]

[Text] [Question] It sometimes seems that foreign policy has taken up a bigger place than ever before in people's lives. Or is it possible that just the mass communications media rouse the feeling that the role of foreign policy has grown?

[Answer] I believe that it is a matter of a process under the influence of which our everyday lives are very strongly linked with foreign events. It can be said that their presence today is indeed extensive, and this is reflected by the foreign policy publications and programs of the mass information media. In my opinion these are authentic and of exceptionally high quality, and they stand up to comparison with the mass information media of any country.

I think that the simultaneous influence of three factors must be taken into account in this process. The role and the effectiveness of the mass communications media in shaping public opinion have indeed grown. At the same time, in the deteriorating international situation, the increasing anxiety manifests itself in growing interest. It is being realized more and more in wide circles of public opinion that our growing dependence on external circumstances goes hand in hand with our open economic life. For this very reason it is important for all of us that our foreign policy information continues to be authentic, swift and, in accordance with the circumstances, objective.

[Question] What does objective "in accordance with the circumstances" mean?

[Answer] Commitment. We should not be satisfied with mere information and orientation, but rather we should strive to formulate our own opinion and develop that of others. Along with accurate communication of facts, we should try to reconcile interests which often conflict with each other, and in the meantime we should do our best to make clear which ones can be brought into harmony with our political aspirations. What does this mean in practice?

In the midst of the increase in international tensions, a nuanced and balanced delineation of foreign policy issues is more and more important. It can cause a lot of problems, for example, if an increase in the danger of war is one-sidedly overstressed. If people feel--because the press, television or radio suggest it--that we are on the verge of thermonuclear catastrophe and the end of the world, this can harm the public mood to such a degree that people have no interest either in living or working. I may add that the danger of world war has undoubtedly increased, but I am convinced that it can be prevented. Suggestion of "the great nothingness" can damage and destroy the struggle waged for prevention of the above-named danger. Or another example: if we give only a negative picture of one significant national power, then the conviction can take root in people that this country's leaders, down to the last one, are incorrigible with whom nothing can be done. There are journalists, for example, according to whom little, if anything at all, which is good can be said about the leader of a capitalist country. They paint a one-sided picture of these leaders by acquainting us only with the reactionary views or by emphasizing exclusively their negative manifestations in connection with us, while concealing the fact that the conduct of these leaders has other elements as well. I consider it a very essential requirement of the Hungarian mass information media to throw light on these, i.e., to give a composite and nuanced picture of incidents and individuals alike.

The last thing we must want is a presentation of the causes of foreign policy tensions in which certain facts are forced into the background or are not given proper consideration, and in their place emotions become dominant. This is more than a vice: it is a defect. Objectively means that we make things clear; we do not intermix the facts with our own opinion--and particularly with our wishes--but at the same time we do not renounce communication of the latter for the sake of the former.

[Question] All this, of course, can often be realized only at the price of contradictions. Let us take as an example the Iranian situation. The man on the street may put it this way: "When did the mass communications media tell the truth? When, out of economic considerations, did they make an effort to give a favorable impression of the Shah who persecuted communists, or when did they place emphasis only on the progressive features of the Islamic revolution which overthrew the Shah's system? Or in the very final situation when, after the death sentences, we are compelled to bring out that the Khomeini movement, as a tactical device, accepted for a while the Iranian communist party as an ally, but as the movement grew stronger, it got even with its allies just as brutally as it had done with its enemies?" How can the open information policy cope with these contradictions, which are peculiar not just to the Iranian situation?

[Answer] Only with a certain kind of restraint. No matter how much of a contradiction it may seem, from beginning to end we properly presented the various phases of a complicated social process. In our presentations we must take into account at all times the interests of interstate relations which automatically determine certain conduct. The Iranian Shah was not the only such partner of ours--it might even be possible to mention this

in our present practice--whom we cannot accept in an ideological/political sense, but with whom we did and do have contacts. The practice of the system of international relations takes for granted the acceptance of those partners with regard to whom we have serious ideological and fundamental reservations. We do not choose the given country's leader; we are compelled to accept the individuals the way they are.

When Khomeini came out on top, nobody was able to predict the meaning, the nature and particularly the consequences of the turnabout. Unfortunately, certain measures and slogans created illusions which life's events later disproved. Writings which appeared in the press occasionally reflected the uncertainty, but I do not think this should be linked with the issue of the authenticity of the mass information media. After all, one cannot expect omniscient wisdom and precise foresight from a chronicler who keeps up with events. Finally, on principle, we stand shoulder to shoulder with the Iranian communists, and on television, on radio and in the press a vast number of publications appeared about the persecution of the Iranian Tudeh Party, and these communications reflected our solidarity as well--but in the last analysis the serious developments constituted the internal affair of the Iranian leadership, and we are not able to cross over the boundaries. For this reason it is important that we always draw a picture which corresponds to the realities. Lastly, no harm is done if the press also reflects the steep price of which the analysis of this situation--developed with restraint--comes into being. Naturally, there are not three kinds of truth and indeed, when presenting the nuanced truth, one must frequently approach it from several directions--and not on a smooth road.

[Question] What might be the reason that people often note this kind of nuanced situation analysis--and ones similar to it--with scepticism? Why is the sober commentary and background information of a confidential leak occasionally received as an apologetic explanation? Why are the contradictions of reality considered a weakness of mass information?

[Answer] As anywhere else, in our country, too, there are people who automatically greet everything with scepticism. Our reporting of the facts is primarily addressed to those who like to be informed and who know that the occasional errors cannot cast doubts on the viewpoint we represent or on the totality of the standpoint, its basic correctness. If we recognize that we have made mistakes, then we do not have to be ashamed of them or conceal them. I believe that in this respect we have not had many liabilities in almost 30 years. So much for certain difficulties in reporting the facts in general; my task is not to judge the whole of mass communications.

As my personal opinion, I would like to say that I consider it a positive sign of our information practice that in such major issues as, for example, rearmament and disarmament we present at the outset the actual strength, standpoint and conduct of both sides--the Soviet Union and the United States, or the Warsaw Pact and NATO--and we draw our conclusions in full knowledge of the actual situation. There is a need for this kind of comparison and multilateral approach, because political events develop extremely quickly

and sometimes in a self-contradictory way, and it is not at all certain that one of our standpoints or another will turn out to be correct in a few years. This goes hand in hand with politics, and I find nothing objectionable in this.

[Question] The opening of Hungarian foreign policy is considered in many places an indisputable European factor. It is enough, I think, if I refer to the visit to Budapest of several Western politicians. What effect can this opening have on the Hungarian mass information media?

[Answer] I do not agree that any kind of opening has taken place. It is not a question of a Hungarian-British, Hungarian-Italian, Hungarian-Norwegian, etc., upper-level dialogue becoming a brand-new international phenomenon. And this also applies to other areas. We have lively relations with other capitalist countries, and not just us but other socialist states as well. Nor can I accept--because I have come across such an opinion--that East-West relations "have become icy." There is in fact a circumscribed area of importance for which the word "estrangement" is suited, and this is the Soviet-American relationship. At the same time, it is a peculiarity of the present situation that the Soviet Union's relations with the other NATO member states have deteriorated. The dialogue is systematic, and we can also observe progress in the economic sphere; in some places economic relations are growing at a faster pace than before. The situation is the same in the relationship between the Warsaw Pact and most of the NATO member states. It is characteristic of recent years, however, that on both sides each country's margin of movement has grown narrower, chiefly because of rearmament resulting from the tension which has emerged. This is indeed a very inauspicious tendency, but it is my conviction that we will move forward this year and in the future, and new high-level bilateral and multilateral meetings will take place in East-West relations.

And if in connection with this it turns out that we ask what kind of influence our expanding relations might have on the mass information media, then my answer is that, on one hand, their responsibility is growing and, on the other hand, one must be aware that our foreign policy cannot achieve its goal without them.

[Question] Sometimes people give voice to the concern that perhaps our allies are not so very delighted with this wide-ranging system of relations. This fear first and foremost would hold back the openness of the mass information media, of course, because it is thought that it is chiefly reflected in them "how far one has gone" in Hungary's foreign relations.

[Answer] Is there in these relations any element whatsoever which is in contradiction to our principles and our developed practice? There is not! If we say that we are adherents of peaceful coexistence, this is not merely a declared principle but rather goes hand in hand with very concrete practical consequences and wide-ranging activity. Among the member states of the Warsaw Pact did any renounce this principle? No, not one! Incomprehension or scepticism may occur about why this country or that country--maybe even Hungary--is advancing in its intensification of upper-level contacts, but in the world of those who are participants in political decision-making there is no such reservation.

Of course, the mass communications media have a limited role in the fact these problems are exaggerated. Here, for example, was the big Western press reaction to the visit of the British prime minister. In it we were often able to come across expressions to the effect that Hungary is the only socialist state with which it is possible to maintain such relations. This is not true. It is enough to refer to the stepped-up international activity which the leaders of the GDR have pursued in recent times. The deliberate and overwrought distinction is primarily a rhetorical device which is rather frequent in recent times, and the rhetoric which has evolved in Soviet-American relations, for example, is scarcely plausible. Sooner or later here one must return to the normal channel; after all, if it continues and if by any chance the propaganda tone deteriorates, then the policy of peaceful coexistence will tolerate it only with difficulty. The rhetoric which some American circles employ with respect to the Soviet Union and the socialist countries--without my overstating its significance--may have an unfavorable effect on very important political decisions. The rhetoric of the Reaganites restricts sober and constructive thought, and when the ideological conflicts rise to the level of interstate relations, then their pernicious influence increases the danger of a warlike clash and hampers normal East-West cooperation. Such exaggerations in the mass media become a direct political factor, and perhaps for this reason in recent times we can meet with some measure of change in this area.

[Question] To bring up the Thatcher visit to Budapest: for the reader and the Televiwer there were explicit mass communication moments worthy of separate analysis. Previously she was the "openly anticommunist Iron Lady". On the basis of personal impressions, however, her behavior revealed positive human emotions, and even she spoke ironically or took pride in the "Iron Lady" name. This is an awfully clever device, and it raises the question of whether our present mass information media "manipulate" us closely and carefully.

[Answer] I do not consider this contradiction to be of fundamental importance, although we undoubtedly have something to learn. Mrs Thatcher is a conservative politician. It is generally known that her ideological views are extremely far from what we in Eastern Europe regard as acceptable. At the same time this opposition does not prevent her from recognizing how great the need is for dialogue and the building of relations. After all, this is also in Great Britain's interest. As a result of this visit, the prime minister will certainly not like socialism or the communists any better than before, and no positive picture of any kind by the press will change this. But it is not possible to deny the favorable effect of the objective factor that by preparing for this visit she perhaps became more thoroughly acquainted than ever before with the actual features which characterize our country's situation. Her personal impressions, however, can provide a sufficient basis, so that after this she judges differently those with whom her direct relations have developed. This may also mean a practical use for such meetings--along with many other things, naturally--and it does not matter if the news reports and accounts reflect her growing interest and the unquestionable signs of expanding personal contact.

The large attendance of representatives of the Western press belongs to this, of course; it helps to make clear that we now bestow greater attention to the given political personality in accordance with the rules of politeness--but if necessary, then over and beyond that. Not only because, according to the obligations of hospitality, this is a basic rule of politeness, but because in this way it is possible to indicate and we want to indicate how important a constructive and reconciliatory role we attribute to the maintenance of such relations.

[Question] In conclusion, still another topic. According to the experiences of foreign policy journalists, it is much more difficult to report on the life of socialist countries. How might it be possible to work out a system of measures which helps to resolve this contradiction?

[Answer] It was an established practice for many years--and to a certain extent it is still valid today--that it is possible to write only positive things about the socialist countries' situation. We are not far from the time when even we said only good things about ourselves to the outside world, and this characterized our entire mass information media. I do not consider this a good practice. This was the reason, for example, that the events in Poland hit people almost traumatically. It happened this way in our country and elsewhere, too; we did not adequately disclose the serious economic and political problems which led to this situation.

It is not possible to change this former attitude overnight, but it is already possible to perceive a change. There are more and more political documents--and in their wake, prepared publications--which paint a real picture of the friendly countries and speak about their difficulties as well. It is sufficient just to point to the publications given out by the sessions of the Soviet party's Central Committee; they often speak very critically, for instance, about the difficulties in internal allocation of provisions, about production problems, about the tasks and about what is to be done. The change is not insignificant, and these internal changes make the journalist's job easier as well. I know that from a professional viewpoint it is harder to write about positive things; after all, it is generally characteristic of journalists--this goes hand in hand with the essence of the profession, and our journalists are no exceptions--that they call attention first and foremost to the defects, the negative things. Greater aptitude and training are required to draw a balanced portrait by making use of successes and positive features. Yet I believe that people hardly expect to be able to read something good in the midst of so many frightful things.

12327

CSO: 2500/549

VALOSAG CIRCULATION, PROFILE EXAMINED

Budapest RADIO ES TV UJSAG in Hungarian 26 Jun - 1 Jul 84 p 5

[Article by Gyorgy Szaraz: "Portrait"]

[Text] What information should I give the viewer? What is it that he is going to see: a portrait film with several characters? Or rather a round-table discussion? It is difficult to define the character of the show, and the editor cannot be blamed for this, nor can the participant—perhaps with one exception.

This one is the "presumptive", i.e. the expected main character

In order to clarify the matter, we must first talk about the VALOSAG, the periodical that once was a bimonthly with a circulation of 5,000 and was edited in a somewhat unprofessional way over coffee and some apricot brandy in the old Luxor and the Hungaria: "we met, discussed, decided, submitted..." Today, after the 25-year jubileum, there is a professional editorial office in one of the stories of a house on Lenin Avenue, the circulation is around 20,000, and the "devil's wheel for squarrels" spins incessantly in the head of the editors, for theirs is the constant monthly problem of the issues just being published, just being sent to the printer, just being submitted. But something of the old breeziness remained: there are chess and word battles in the editorial office, and even one or two shots of brandy is available to anyone who enters, for the VALOSAG "is a place where anyone from the street is allowed to enter if the editors happen to be there" — and if he feels himself capable of joining the rambling discussion of the editors mentioned.

For the VALOSAG has not changed in this respect: it is an intellectual and non-scientific periodical that "dabbles" at everything: at the social and natural sciences, at art and literature, at the domestic and foreign affairs of the past, present and future. Its one-time monopoly is gone: surrounded by literary, artistic and scientific periodicals, it transmits not so much information anymore but rather a "picture of relationships." And the statement heard in the program is probably true, namely that in the "age saturated by information," people are looking for "dessert" in reading, there being few "lunatics" who study even the imprints.

But the strangeness of this program results precisely from the fact that it was originally meant to portray someone whose name can be known only from the imprints. For he does not write, only reads; he was present at the VALOSAG's birth, and has been editing the periodical for 22 years. But he never appears as an author, either there or anywhere else. It was the 25th anniversary that presented the opportunity for the editors of Television to coax him into coming out of the back room of the office.

The rest I know from them.

First he protested: what is this thing for? Who the devil is interested in him? Besides, he hates to appear, cannot even speak, why don't you find someone else! When his friends and colleagues "treacherously betrayed" him by joining the brigade set up to convince him, he finally agreed: all right, he is going to sit in front of the camera, but one or two people from the editorial office should be there too, he needs help if they do not want him to fail ... The TV capitulated: all right, be it, perhaps the program will thus be more relaxed and colorful, let those "one or two people" come. But the "main protagonist" continued to lament: it is not proper to exclude the other editors from the talk. And it is unthinkable that the older colleagues, the editorial committee would not be represented by anyone! ...

Why should I make a long story of it? The TV capitulated again -- it was probably a correct action -- although the program turned out differently than its editors originally thought it would.

The viewer may notice that in the beginning the discussion partners are trying to act as "subordinates" of the main character about whom we learn (through some mild coercion) that he was educated at Sarospatak, then went to the Szikra and the Gondolat publishers and finally to the editorial office of the VALOSAG. True, he confesses, in connection with his years at Sarospatak, that he never was a good student and that there was nothing in which he surpassed the others. And that is the end.

But recalling the spirit of the Sarospatak school, he remembers the democracy and the collective spirit, although at that time there were no outstanding teachers at the old school and there were all sorts of children: "priest, soldier, swineherd, dogcatcher, Judas, as the verse says ..." But somehow "everyone could feel that it depends on the individual: in the self-educational group, in the gymnasium and during recitation ..." In talking about the Szikra publisher, he recalls Erno Czobel, "an experienced and knowledgeable man"; then he mentions Aladar Mod, the founder of the VALOSAG, who "dedicated his life to it" and "did not care if he was branded a revisionist or an old dogmatic; it was only the adjective 'sectarian' he found difficult to tolerate."

As the talk continues, the use of "I" becomes less frequent. The partners are unable to keep the conversation in the "desired channel," perhaps not even noticing the subtle change of direction: for a time they have been talking about the VALOSAG and only the VALOSAG, the "presumptive" main character is not the center anymore, at least not on the surface. True,

he returns once more to the "I." He admits, of course, that his role at the periodical is different from that of the others: for he was constantly evaluating and thinking whether one should dedicate a significant part of one's life to "such a cause." For the others -- including those sitting around him -- dedicate only a smaller part of their lives as all of them are writers or scientists, public figures or publicists; but, nevertheless, "things all together as they did in Sarospatak, for everyone is willing "to do his share"...

What follows is full of plurals. The periodical's past and present, in the background the changing realities of the 60's, 70's and 80's. In spite of this, I feel that the portrait show, too, was successful, all "shrudeness" of the subject notwithstanding.

9414

CSO: 2500/552

HUNGARY

TOURISTS TALLIED AT 3.79 MILLION AT HALF YEAR

Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 31 Jul 84 p 1

[Article: "Almost 4 Million Guests from Abroad — Increased Revenues, Still Few Programs"]

[Text] More are coming than expected. True, they stay for a shorter period than last year, but they spend more money. This is the picture of foreign tourism this year. Although the entire year's tourism cannot be precisely assessed from the data pertaining to the first half of the year, for generally only one-third of the tourists come by this time of the year. However, hotel and travel agency reservations show a favorable prognosis.

While previously statisticians were able to use the data of border crossings for boosting the data of tourism (for they included transit visas as well), the situation is now exactly the opposite. The ratio of real tourists increased more than that of transit travellers. The number of border crossings increased by 27 percent since the first half of last year, and the number of persons staying at least for 3 days increased by 37 percent.

Regarding state revenues, it is not insignificant where the foreign tourists spend the night. Here, too, there is a favorable change: the commercial lodgings (hotels, motels, campings, boardings) registered 22 percent more persons arriving from socialist countries, and 6 percent more arriving from capitalist countries.

In the first half of the year 3,791,000 foreigners crossed our border: 2,063,000 coming from the CEMA-countries, 1,339,000 from capitalist countries, 389,000 from Yugoslavia, 38 percent more from Czechoslovakia, 49 percent from Poland, 23 percent more from Bulgaria, 7 percent more from GDR, 13 percent more from Romania, and 4 percent more from the Soviet Union; 22 percent more from Austria, 7 percent more from France, 23 percent more from England, 15 percent more from FRG, 35 percent more from Italy, 19 percent more from Canada, and 19 percent more from the United States.

With regard to revenues, 2,586,000,000 forints came from ruble accounts between January and July; this is an increase of 39 percent when compared to the same period last year. Revenues in dollars increased 125 percent from last year, totalling 4,639 million forints.

About 70 percent of the revenues come from boarding and meals. The rest comes from transportation, various programs, services, and gifts. This 30 percent of "other expenses" is, at the most, half of the European average; Hungary's programs for foreign tourists are well below the desirable level. This must encourage our authorities in foreign tourism and in the cultural and entertainment industries, and show the desired direction of progress.

9414

CSO: 2500/552

DESCRIPTION OF LEGAL AID SERVICE FOR WORKERS

Budapest SZAKSZERVEZETI SZEMLE in Hungarian Jul 84 pp 22-27

[Article by Dr Laszlo Zsiga, department chief of the National Trade Union Council, SZOT: "Objectively About Legal Aid Service"]

[Text] In 1975 it was necessary to institute mandatorily trade-union legal aid service at some 50 centrally designated enterprises and, by way of experiment,¹ at an industrial cooperative and, starting in 1976, at industrial, construction-industry, transportation and agricultural enterprises placed in the A and B category--hence, in general, with a work force greater than 2,500--as well as at industrial cooperatives employing at least 600 workers.² There is likewise a possibility for organizing legal aid service at other enterprises, provided that the individual and material conditions for it exist and that the management of the industrial branch trade union, in agreement with the minister (leader of the national authoritative organ or the chairman of the National Federation of Artisan Cooperatives), grants permission.³

Who Does It, How Is It Done?

Up until now legal aid service has been organized at one third of the enterprises and institutions. Within these, of course, there are differences both in the number of legal aid services and from the viewpoint of the opportunity for recourse to legal assistance. In the domain of individual industrial branches (sectors)--with the exception of workplaces having a relatively small work force--independent or joint legal aid service was organized everywhere for the workers of two or more enterprises or factories with a reasonable concentration of personal and material conditions.

Organization of legal aid service is the task of the trade-union committee of the enterprise, factory or institution. Keeping in mind the central guiding principles, this committee can determine the organizational form and operational arrangement of the legal aid service and directs its activity, for which it is responsible morally, professionally and materially with respect to the person who takes advantage of the legal aid.

The greater part of trade-union legal aid services are independently organized, so that they give legal assistance only to their own workers.

Such a legal aid service is provided—in accordance with the size of the work force—by a full-time lawyer having a working relationship with the trade-union committee or perhaps by a part-time specialist (mainly an experienced retiree, in a smaller number of cases someone for whom it is a secondary position), generally with the help of a few social work committees. Experience shows that the activity of legal aid offices which operate in this form is the most successful. In this way, namely, uninterrupted daily assistance can be assured, and it is in fact possible for the legal aid service to be a part of the trade-union work at the job site. The goal is for those employed in legal aid service to become involved fully in the life of the workers' movement. They assist the basic organizations and the trade-union officials in their job of protecting the workers' interests and in the exercise of their rights of representation (for example, in writing enterprise rules and regulations or in monitoring their implementation).

However, the operation of legal aid services organized in this manner is not free of problems. In many places the problem of providing legal aid to the workers of nonindependent settlements and of units geographically far from the headquarters of enterprises—chiefly those centered in Budapest—is unsolved. The trade unions' county councils are finding more and more often that legal aid service which operates—if it operates—by setting aside reception days, or rather reception hours, or perhaps only when the opportunity arises is not a solution for the workers of small enterprises and factory units, settlements and branch offices. Workers in such places cannot really count on the provision of efficient legal aid, at best only on incidental and frequently belated information. Institution of joint legal aid services—on the basis of the success of legal aid service organized originally for the workers of several enterprises—can remedy the problems. It did not turn out to be true that, in any case, the only person capable of furnishing legal aid is someone who through his other work is continually engaged at the given enterprise. The results of active joint legal aid services show that this organizational form—like the independent legal aid service employing full-time workers or retirees—provides impartial and reassuring help for the workers. This form makes it possible for the trade unions' organized legal aid to become accessible to every worker who asserts a right to it. (This form is also more advantageous to the enterprise in the midst of their financial bases, which have become more burdensome). For the trade-union committees, however, the joint defrayal of expenses opens up the possibility for selecting the most qualified lawyers and other specialists and engaging them in full-time positions at appropriate salaries. This also provides assurance that, as a result of their existing work relationship with the trade union, they participate in the life of trade-union organizations which jointly operate the legal aid service.

The trade-union legal aid services currently employ about 3,500 persons as genuine administrators. Among these today there is still a significant number of those who provide assistance part-time, on the basis of a commission recognized by a regularly received fee or compensation, or in voluntary work. The system has problems primarily when it is a single

individual--and an employee of the given enterprise into the bargain--who furnishes the legal aid. Experience shows that this kind of legal aid service does not fulfill its purpose in all respects. It is not uninterrupted, and it is less responsible. On the one hand, the assistance giver is bound by the tasks connected with his primary job; on the other hand, he cannot in most instances take part in the management of significant labor-related and social-insurance matters fundamental to the trade unions' job of protecting workers' interests, since there is a conflict of interests between his enterprise and the workers requesting legal aid. Therefore, for the time being, it is possible only in an exceptional case that a given enterprise's legal adviser or legal clerk single-handedly furnishes the legal aid service.⁴

Attorneys also participate in legal aid service work, on the basis of an occasional assignment or as permanent agents. Their activity is valuable; it increases the professionalism of the legal aid service's institutional system. It is a concern, however, that their employment is rather limited; it is confined to providing representation and advice during reception hours. The majority of them, therefore, do not participate in the life of the trade unions and the workers' movement.

There is also the possibility for organizing legal aid service in the industrial and sectoral trade-union centers, as well as on the trade unions' county councils. At the majority of these, legal aid offices operate for those who make declarations in connection with the activity of one or another legal aid service, or who turn to the office with their business or their complaint because there is still no legal aid service at their workplace. These offices help and supervise the activity of enterprise legal aid services belonging to the industrial branch (in the domain of the county) and prepare recommendations for the development of the institution and the improvement of its work. It is to be noted that some trade-union committees--arm in arm with the enterprises--to a certain extent rely upon the legal aid offices of the county trade-union councils and the trade-union centers and therefore do not urge the organization of their "own" so-called central legal aid service, or its proper setting into operation. It must be perceived, however, that especially the county trade-union councils with their current personnel endowments cannot always on their own make up for the legal aid services which are lacking chiefly in places far from enterprise headquarters. (But today this is not the primary task of the county trade-union councils; it is rather the assistance, supervision, coordination and administration of the legal aid services in their district. In this their possibilities are better than those of the trade-union centers.)

Giving Advice, Representation, Preparing Documents

The legal aid service--as a result of its goal--is a specific "lawyerly" activity. Its task is, namely, that through it the workers receive organized and professional assistance in their transactions, their proceedings and their lawsuits both within the workplace and before

different state organs. More specifically, in the interest of more efficiently protecting the rights of workers and in the management of their legal and official affairs, it is the task of legal aid services:

- to give legal advice and information, aiding in the settlement of legal disputes by mutual agreement, if possible;
- to represent the workers before authorities and courts of law, or take legal measures in their interest;
- to prepare documents, petitions and contracts on behalf of the workers.

This rendering of assistance cannot mean, of course, "assistance at any price"! Especially not for circumvention of the will of the rules of law or for wrongful use of legal rights in any manner. Nor can assistance be some kind of "pettifoggery," i.e., it may not hamper the work of authorities or courts of law.

The requested information, enlightenment and advice--after adequate discretion and preparation--are binding for anyone and in any matter, regardless of whether the requesting worker is a trade-union member or not. Representing the worker, however, is not binding; it cannot be provided in the case of individuals with conflicting interests. The trade-union committee decides whether such legal aid is given. If it is, representation can only take place on the basis of special authorization after listening, of course, to the opinion of the competent official of the legal aid service.

Preparation of a petition, contract or other private document is likewise an exceptional rendering of assistance and is not binding. The colleague furnishing the legal aid himself decides about preparation of the document, provided the trade-union committee does not impose restrictions or the explicit instruction of some rule of law does not prohibit it as, for example, the preparation of a civil partnership contract.⁵

The activity of the trade-union legal aid service increases from year to year. While in 1977 assistance was offered in 150,000 cases, 5 years later the number of cases handled and registered was nearly 180,000. Within these the subject of the cases and the method of rendering assistance are diverse, depending on the composition of the workers of a given workplace, on the management of the legal aid service work and principally on the attitude and circumstances of the colleagues performing the legal aid service. In any event the nationwide combined data give food for thought. Legal aid service is not satisfactory, for instance, in cases involving labor relations and social insurance. Their numerical proportion (18 + 8 percent) has not changed in years. Since the organization of legal aid services the decrease is modest in the number of cases coming before agencies which resolve legal controversy, or rather that is not a consequence of service activity. The number of cases tried in courts of law in which the legal aid service represents the workers does not reach 5 percent, and the number of cases before labor arbitration committees is

almost nonexistent. But preoccupation with such cases should be the fundamental task of legal aid services. In the interest of thorough clarification and because of the weaknesses of labor and personnel activity and in order to establish the circumstances which mitigate or substantiate responsibility--in order to promote the making of a decision satisfactory to the parties--there is a great need not only for the employer but also for the worker to participate, with a representative who possesses adequate preparedness and skill, in the arbitration committee talks and in the judicial proceedings. This is all the more a rightful claim, because when all is said and done, a decision is rendered in favor of the worker in nearly two thirds of labor-related disputes! This means, however, that in these cases a distinct infraction of the law occurred, or the worker suffered an injustice the treatment of which deserved the support of the trade union, or rather the legal aid service. Presumably, with the collaboration of the legal aid services, a good part of the disputed cases would be prevented, or they would be redressed in a short time--within the workplace--by a decision of the labor arbitration committee or the social insurance council.

In labor-related disputes the trade-union committees themselves often do not correctly judge the responsibility of representation of the worker. Experience shows, namely, that apart from wage claims or compensation due to factory accidents, representation hardly occurs in other cases. They believe that trade-union assistance is not justified in the cases of disciplinary and material accusation which form the bulk of labor-related disputes. Although the majority of judicial decisions which change, in whole or in part, the labor arbitration committee rulings establish that the affected worker did not commit the given disciplinary breach or wrong; or if he did, the decision rendered because of it showed inconsistent practice, or the punishment or imposed damages--all things considered--were disproportionately severe. With this in view, the thought is finally worthy of consideration that the law should empower the courts, in the interest of the worker and the court, to order the trade-union legal aid service to represent the worker--parimarily in labor-related suits.⁶ This in its nature would be similar to the omnipresent legal aid which today, in more and more European countries, through trade unions or state legal offices protects those who are unable to meet the expenses of the prevalent attorney's fee.

In What Kind of Cases?

Civil cases make up most (33 percent) of the legal aid services' activity, and this is related to the change in workers' living conditions and the increase in their personal possessions. The legal aid services are occupied to a large extent (16 percent) with cases pertaining to the sphere of family law, especially those concerning women in the workplace. Here the form of assistance is information and advice. In defense of the semilegal interests of children, however, the legal aid services appear before the local specialized agencies and also act in matrimonial cases.

Legal aid given in state administrative cases is similar in its proportions (15 percent), mostly information and advice, preparation of petitions, and guidance for filling out official questionnaires and printed forms. The legal aid services seldom appear as authorized agents in concrete cases, primarily because these cases do not require a personal appearance. If, however, it is advisable and the workplace leaders are accommodating, permission is granted to make inquiries rather than directing the affected workers to a legal aid service.

In cases of minor offenses and punishment the role of legal aid services is not significant. For all practical purposes, it is restricted to information and advice in accordance with what is stated in the Legal Directives. Providing representation in the case of a minor offense is quite uncommon. (For example, for transportation workers in the case of commission of an offense involving negligence.)

In their entirety the legal aid services perform their work according to expectation. Not more weakly than the other enterprise lawyers and legal advisers who by profession provide legal activity. The majority of them possess the necessary professional and political training, and while maintaining the moral requirements, they fulfill their assignment. Nevertheless, in the future greater emphasis must be placed on strengthening the relationship between trade unions and workers through the activity of the legal aid services. The prevention, or rather the satisfactory settlement, of disputes chiefly in connection with labor relations, worker safety, social insurance and innovation can assure this. It is proper to help the local (generally official) administration so that disposal of their cases becomes easier for the workers, and they are excused from the inquiries which cause loss of work. There is a very important basic principal, however: if it appears, after thorough review of a case which comes before the legal aid service, that the person requesting assistance is wrong, it is necessary to say this bluntly. It must be convinced of the groundlessness of his request and claim, and it may not undertake purposeless representation or preparation of petitions. If, on the other hand, the grievance or the claim is well-founded and its redress or enforcement are possible only before the agencies marked out for this, then providing representation at the proceeding is justified.

There are still inequalities and disproportionate burdens in the work of the legal aid service. In some places, considering the number of workers, it is oversized and therefore costly, but there are examples of inexpensive solutions as well.

The legal aid service is a peculiarly organized institution. The given trade-union organ or trade-union committee creates it; its operating expenses, however—in light of the necessity of personal and material conditions—are guaranteed by the enterprise. Financial recognition for those who carry out the tasks depends on whether they perform in the framework of "labor relations," on the basis of a "commission" or in voluntary work. Establishment of the amount of their wages or fee takes place on the basis

of the enterprise's prevailing wage regulations pertinent to the workers and in the light of the amount of legal aid service activity and the time spent on it. Experience shows that in many places this is overlooked. In many cases the fee of those who provide legal aid service lags behind in comparison with those who perform similar work at the given enterprise. On other occasions those employed on a commission basis receive unjustifiably high emoluments (on the pretext of honorarium, bonus, etc.). Playing a certain role in all this is the fact that in many places the wage formulas published as a Legal Directive appendix are applied in unchanged form, although they have been modified more than once, or new ones have taken their place. Thus in ascertaining the wages (or fee) of those employed in legal aid service, the classification conditions and the wage formulas valid for the given enterprise's workers are the standard, and not just in the case of full-time workers and employees with the trade-union committee. For part-time workers (moonlighters and retirees) as well as in the case of those who perform work (on permanent commission) in the framework of other legal relations, it is always necessary to establish the individual basic wage (fee) starting from the amounts decreased in proportion to the part-time work or activity. Along with all this, it is proper to be attentive to the wages of a given enterprise's workers who perform a similar job and, last but not least, to the fact that the established amount may not surpass the income of the trade-union committee's independent secretary.

FOOTNOTES

1. 2031/1974. (VIII. 18.) Council of Ministers' resolution and the 1974. XI. 12-1 SZOT Legal Directive.
2. 2003/1976. (I. 8.) Council of Ministers' resolution and the 1976. III. 27-1 SZOT Legal Directive.
3. 2004/1977. (II. 22.) Council of Ministers' resolution and the 1/1979. II. 28-1 SZOT Legal Directive.
4. 1977. II. 28-1 standpoint of SZOT chairmanship.
5. 28/1981. (IX. 9.) Labor Code ordinance section 2 paragraph 2, Civil Code section 573 paragraph 2.
6. Gaspardy: "A Look into the Future of Collective Membership Disputes," HUNGARIAN LAW 1983: 4. (page 341).

12327

CSO: 2500/536

FOREIGN POLICY GAINS, DIRECTION OUTLINED

Warsaw NOWE DROGI in Polish No 7, Jul 84 pp 105-119

[Article by Wojciech Multan: "Foreign Policy of the Polish People's Republic Over the last 40 Years"]

[Text] Forty years in the life of a nation and state with a history of over 1000 years seems to be a relatively short amount of time. However, in the history of nations, just as in the lives of individuals, not all years are of the same importance. The ten-century history of our nation has seen particular periods that could in no way be measured in years but in the intensity of their great events, the implications of which would later influence entire generations. Undoubtedly, the final years of World War II and the first few years following liberation was one of those periods of great significance to the fate of the nation. It was in this period that the constitutional framework of the new state was introduced and the principles of reborn Poland's foreign policy were formulated. In this period, it became clear that there was a tight cause-and-effect relationship between the fundamental social and political changes and the essential reorientation of Poland's foreign policy. The foreign policy of this state was supposed to reflect its revolutionary constitutional changes.

Lenin's thesis of a close connection between a state's internal and foreign policy was also confirmed in the case of our country. Let us remember that the leader of the Russian revolution wrote: "There is no greater and more harmful delusion than the belief that foreign policy is a thing apart from domestic policy;"¹ "the separation of foreign policy from politics as a whole, and most of all, the opposition of foreign policy to domestic policy is a fundamentally erroneous, nonmarxist and unscholarly idea;"² "Domestic policy and foreign policy are each inseparably linked to one another."³ It can be said that there was and continues to be as much difference between the foreign policies of socialist and prewar Poland as there are between both states' class structure, social and political order and domestic policy.

Briefly described, the basic questions of Polish foreign policy in the last 40 years have been: 1) the matter of Poland's borders and 2) the totality of foreign factors determining the security and peaceful development of our country. These were problems of a very fundamental nature that have given rise to many meritorious as well as temporal questions of less scope. The chief

directions of Polish foreign policy were, on one hand, an outgrowth of the government's political principles and, on the other hand, a product of the international situation under which Poland was supposed to realize its national interests. In turn, the foundation of Poland's foreign policy was: a) the interests of the new class that came to power in the country after 1945; b) the social, political and economic conditions in Poland at that time and c) external factors, above all principle changes in the world and European balance of forces most clearly reflected in the establishment of the entire grouping of socialist states.

Fundamental changes in Poland's foreign policy were felt both in the very principles and goals of our nation's activities and in its international activities. We were then and still remain aware of the fact that these key elements of Poland's foreign policy were brought into focus not only by the class structure of Polish society in these years and its current and long-term interests but also by its thousand-year-old culture, national tradition and, to a considerable degree, its tragic experiences from the loss of independence in 1939.⁴

The principle difference between Poland's foreign policy at this point and that of the governing classes before World War II was the direct result of the change of Polish government and changes in Europe's political map. The conceptual assumptions behind these changes were the due product of the political thinking of the Polish radical left-wing.⁵ The main transvaluations of policy were made concerning Poland's defensive alliances. The basic need for reorientation of this question was dictated, on one hand, by considerations of class solidarity with the world proletariat and, on the other hand, by the fiasco of Poland's prewar alliances. Overall state interests and considerations of a class nature made it necessary to found Poland's security on an alliance with the Soviet Union and the other European nations of a similar political profile. The development of allied cooperation and friendship with neighboring socialist states became the first and foremost principle of Polish foreign policy.

At the same time, the constitutional considerations of reborn Poland determined its attitude to the great problem of national liberation struggles in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Solidarity with these nations and providing them political and, as much as possible, economic support became the essence of the second principle of the foreign policy of the Polish People's Republic.

The third principle was the acknowledgement in theory and realization in practice of peaceful coexistence with states of different political order. This was reflected in efforts to maintain proper relations with all western states with respect for equal rights, mutual interests and noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries.

The real concept of the principles of Polish foreign policy is found in the state document of the highest legislative rank, the Constitution of the Polish People's Republic, article 6 of which reads:

"In its policy, the Polish People's Republic:

- 1) is guided by the interests of the Polish people, its sovereignty, independence and security and its will to peace and cooperation between nations;**
- 2) is bound to the highest traditions of solidarity with the forces of freedom and progress and strengthens friendship and cooperation with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and other socialist states;**
- 3) supports relations based on peaceful coexistence and cooperation with states of different social order."**

Poland's foreign policy, like that of any other country, can be assessed from different points of view. However, the most important question is that of determining its effectiveness by stating to what degree it has fulfilled its mission, i.e. the degree to which it has brought about the creation of favorable conditions for the existence and development of the nation and state. This of course refers to external conditions such as the policy of defensive alliances, international guarantees of security (permanence) of borders, effective commitment to the development of the above tendencies in the international arena, the domination of which requires objectively favorable pre-conditions for the existence and development of the Polish state and finally, the protection and promotion of economic, cultural and other forms of equal cooperation between Poland and other nations.

Therefore, with regard to the principles of Polish foreign policy, they were formulated on the basis of both Poland's internal conditions at that time and the international situation. The internal conditions involved revolutionary constitutional changes defining the class character of the Polish state after 1945. On the other hand, the international situation was seeing principal changes in the balance of forces in Europe and throughout the world. The attitude of the chief states, especially those of the West, to the new political order in Eastern Europe and its leaders was not without significance.

Speaking of the new international situation in which the foreign missions of our state were realized, especially in the period immediately following the end of World War II, we cannot overlook the fact that almost half of this 40-year period was taken up by the cold war and therefore conditions least favoring the development of comprehensive and equal international relations. For truth's sake, it should also be noted that our country at a very early stage opposed the policy of confrontation initiated by the West and undertook decisive and often successful actions to counter this peace-endangering tendency.

The Poland reborn from the ruin of war saw a guarantee of future world peace in cooperation with the main powers of the antinazi coalition and its own security in close friendship to the Soviet Union and in good relations with France, Great Britain and the United States. This was expressed by the president of the National People's Council in his New Year's message on 31 December 1944 in which he stated: "The growing alliance between the USSR, England and America will become the foundation for world peace and a new arrangement of forces and political relations throughout the world. The most desirable relations with

England and America and Polish-Soviet friendship increases the importance of Poland in this future world order and will hasten its political and economic reconstruction."⁶ The same motive, i.e. the overcoming of anomalies in international relations, as characterized by the cold war, and the desire to develop peaceful cooperation between all nations, formed the basis of many original Polish initiatives that will be discussed later in this article.

From the ashes and ruin of the war, a new Polish state with a new territorial and constitutional form emerged in a popular democratic revolution. This did not take place without resistance on the part of both domestic and international conservative forces. This gave the newly-organized and fledgling Polish foreign service two primary tasks: to obtain international recognition for the socialist government and, a no less important and difficult task, to negotiate Poland's new borders. The first task was a complex one in that the emigre Polish government in London was, for broad class interests, supported by practically all of the western states. However, as a result of many actions taken by the Polish foreign service in the period of 1944-45, the Provisional Government of National Unity was recognized by the chief western nations in the second half of 1945. This was mainly due to the course events had taken in Poland. Nevertheless, throughout the international arena, there was a sharp battle over world recognition of these realia. This recognition in turn became in many cases the fundamental prerequisite for Poland's functioning in international affairs.

The question of Poland's borders became a very complicated and long-term problem. In essence, this was really only a problem as far as the West was concerned since the border settlement did not constitute an important problem with the Soviet Union or Czechoslovakia. As a result of negotiations conducted on 24-26 July 1944 between the Polish National Liberation Committee and the Soviet government, the present-day eastern borders of Poland were established. This settlement took into consideration the right to independence of the Ukrainian and Belorussian peoples and adhered to the Curzon line with certain deviations favorable to Poland. This was also the realization of the well-known agreement of the Yalta Conference stating that "Poland's eastern border should follow the Curzon line with deviations of from 5-8 kilometers in Poland's favor in certain areas."⁷ Negotiations on the Polish-Czech border were also successfully finalized. Of great importance to these negotiations were the "Friendship and Mutual Aid Treaty" signed by our nation on 10 March 1947 and the 4 July 1947 agreement comprehensively and completely regulating economic cooperation between Poland and Czechoslovakia.⁸

The return to the old Piast lands became the subject of the most intense and long-lasting political and diplomatic battle in the entire 40 years of the history of the Polish People's Republic. The first stage of this battle consisted of the political and diplomatic activities of our nation defined by the provisions of the Potsdam Agreement. This activity was aimed at obtaining the great powers' approval of that idea. From the very start of discussions on the western borders, the Soviet Union was the great advocate of the Polish territorial demands,⁹ presented officially to the Big Three by the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity on 10 July 1945¹⁰ and then at the same conference on 24 July 1945 in Potsdam. The conferences' formulations of

Poland's western borders, later interpreted in so many ways, were as follows: in the Yalta formula, the heads of three states recognized that: "Poland must make considerable territorial acquisitions in the north and west. They feel that at the proper time the opinion of the new Polish Provisional National Unity Government must be obtained concerning the size of the acquisitions and that it will be necessary to refer the final delimitation of Poland's western border to the peace conference."

In turn, the somewhat broader Potsdam formula stated: "The three heads of state agree that before the final determination of Poland's western border is made, former German territory to the east of a line running from the Baltic Sea directly west of Swinoujscie along the Oder to the mouth of the Western Neisse and then along the Western Neisse to Czechoslovakia, together with that part of East Prussia which, according to the decision reached at today's conference, has not been placed under the administration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and including the territory of the former Free City of Danzig, will be placed under the administration of the Polish state and is therefore not considered a part of the Soviet zone of occupation of Germany."¹¹

Poland accepted the above declaration of the great powers as totally valid. It had, of course, good reasons to do so. However, known political considerations connected with the very essence of the East-West conflict caused that the western powers, especially the United States and Great Britain, refused final confirmation of this decision. Therefore, the recognition by the West of our borders on the Oder and Neisse became one of the central matters of our foreign policy for almost a quarter of a century. In practice, this was connected to a broader question, namely Poland's position on the so-called German question, i.e. its views on the full realization of the Potsdam decisions on Germany, its attitude toward positive social and political changes taking place in the territory that was to become the German Democratic Republic and to that state itself once it was established.

Efforts from the very beginning to encroach upon the integrity of Poland's western borders have been identified with attempts to upset peace in Europe. As early as the "Declaration of the Government of the Republic" of 16 October 1945 and the statement made on the occasion of our country's signing of the United Nations Charter, we can read that "as far as the peace of Europe is concerned, it will be maintained if the two following conditions are met: the inviolability of the Polish borders settled by friendly negotiation with the allies in Potsdam and Moscow."¹²

The effect of Poland's skillful allied policy was the creation of a situation in which the strong defensive ties with the European nations of the Warsaw Pact and the defensive potential of the whole socialist community guaranteed the security of Poland's borders despite the fact that they were unrecognized by the West for almost 25 years. From this moment, any aggressive act against the inviolability of Poland's borders could cause a general European conflict. Therefore, Wladyslaw Gomulka was able to state to the United Nations General Assembly in 1960 that: "Poland's borders are secure. There is no problem of borders, only one of peace."¹³ A retrospective look at all of Poland's policy on this crucial matter for Poland and Europe's security gives much cause for

satisfaction.

The West, led by the German Federal Republic and the United States, had to revise the concepts that they had dictated for a quarter of a century and give up the use of force. The confirmation of this was the treaty to normalize relations between Poland and the German Federal Republic which was signed on 7 December 1970. Article I of the treaty reads: "1. The Polish People's Republic and the German Federal Republic agree that the existing border established in section IX of the Potsdam Conference of 2 August 1945 running from the Baltic Sea directly west of Swinoujscie along the Oder to the mouth of the Lusatian Neisse and along the Lusatian Neisse to the border of Czechoslovakia forms the western state border of the Polish People's Republic. 2. Both parties agree to the inviolability of these borders, now and in the future, and are obliged to unconditionally respect each other's territorial integrity. 3. Both parties here announce that they have no territorial claims on each other and will make no such claims in the future."¹⁴

Another confirmation of article I of the Polish-West German treaty was Principle III of the Final Act of the Conference of European Security and Cooperation, the conference initiated by our country and which yielded positive results thanks to the contributions made by Polish negotiators among others. In Principle III, 33 European states along with the United States and Canada solemnly swore to: "mutually respect each other's borders as inviolable as well as the borders of all other countries in Europe and to refrain from making any attacks on these borders now or in the future. In accordance with this, the signatory nations will refrain from any demands or actions aimed at takeover and usurpation of part or all of the **territory** of any of the participating nations."¹⁵ The problem of international acknowledgement of Poland's borders was finally and definitively solved by this conference. The Polish People's Republic thus achieved that which had eluded prewar Poland at the Locarno conference.

If we speak about the reorientation of Poland's foreign policy following World War II, we are above all referring to its fundamental change of defensive alliance. This change consists of three principal elements: 1) Poland's change of government; 2) its historical experience with alliances and 3) the specific needs under the new political and military system in Europe and the world. The Polish left wing, long before the end of the war, propagandized the foundation of Poland's security and proper international position on an alliance and close cooperation with the Soviet Union¹⁶ and, immediately following the liberation of the western lands from Nazi occupation, gave its full energies to the realization of this goal which it regarded as an outgrowth of the constitutional changes in our land. The factor that produced the change in postwar Poland's concept of military alliances was the experience of the Second Polish Republic. Prewar Poland's dependency on alliance to France and Great Britain was a total disappointment and the result of this was Nazi aggression and the tragedy of occupation. The bitter taste of September 1939 and the sufferings and humiliation of years of subjugation was too fresh to return to the normal state of affairs without drawing some conclusions about Poland's alliance policy. This element played a strong role in the political education of that part of society that favored orientation toward the Soviet Union.

Finally, the third precondition for the fundamental reorientation of the Polish state's postwar alliance policy was the radical change of forces in Europe and the world. Reborn Poland needed a solid ally that would find it in its interests to restore a powerful Polish state within borders satisfactory to itself. Poland needed an ally able and willing to become involved in negotiating these borders with the main members of the anti-Nazi coalition and then guarantee the integrity of those borders. As a power more interested than any other in preserving the fruits of its victory over fascism, only the Soviet Union could be such an ally.

In the last 40 years, we can find a long list of Polish activities in foreign policy aimed at maintaining and developing close allied cooperation with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. International legal formulas for these activities formed the basis of many agreements on different levels between states. These agreements regulated the chief manifestations of activities of both sides.¹⁷ Undoubtedly, the most important agreement was the Friendship, Mutual Aid and Postwar Cooperation Treaty, signed on 21 April 1945 by Provisional Government Premier S. Osobka-Morawski and the Soviet chief of state J. Stalin.¹⁸ The historical significance of this treaty is that it formed the basic premise for Poland's recovery of the old Piast lands with international approval and became the fundamental element of our security in general. Article 3 of the treaty states that the signing parties are obliged: "at the conclusion of the present war with Germany to use all forces at their disposal to eliminate any threat of renewed aggression by Germany or any other state allying itself directly or in any other way with Germany." In order to attain this goal they announced that: "they will participate in the most sincere spirit of cooperation in all international actions aimed at preserving the peace and security of nations and make a full contribution to the realization of these high goals." In article 4, the signatory nations have the responsibility that if: "one of the treaty signatories in the postwar period becomes involved in military actions against renewed German aggression or against any other state that in such a war has allied itself directly or in any other way with Germany, the other signatory will immediately provide military and other types of aid and support with all available resources."¹⁹ On 8 April 1965, this treaty was replaced with a new agreement with the same obligations for allied support against aggression.²⁰

In the second half of the 1940's, Poland concluded similar alliances with Yugoslavia (15 March 1944)²¹, Czechoslovakia (10 March 1947)²², Bulgaria (29 May 1948)²³, Hungary (18 June 1948)²⁴ and Romania (26 January 1949)²⁵. These treaties were all renewed at the end of the 1960's.²⁶

A new quality in the alliance system of the Polish People's Republic was the conclusion in Warsaw in May 1955 of the Warsaw Pact²⁷ and the military and political organization of socialist countries on the basis of this pact. Article 4 of the Warsaw Pact states that: "in the case of an armed attack in Europe on one or several pact member states by any state or group of states, every pact member state, in realization of the right to individual or collective defense, in accordance with article 51 of the United Nations Charter, will aid the attacked state or states individually or in agreement with other Warsaw

Pact states, using all necessary means included the use of armed forces."²⁸ For Poland as well as for all other pact signatories, membership in the Warsaw Pact did not mean renunciation of the idea of forming a collective security system in Europe. "In concluding the Warsaw Pact, it is obvious that we are not resigning our efforts to establish a European security system. Furthermore, we are convinced that it is necessary to conclude such a pact. For that reason, if a general European collective security pact is ever concluded, then the Warsaw Pact will no longer be valid."²⁹

Our nation took an active part in all of the work associated with the creation of the Warsaw Pact and is also actively participating in the realization of the pact agreements. "The Warsaw Pact was a warning to those attempting or planning to use a policy of force against us. At the same time, the signatories of this pact are consistent spokesmen for the policy of peaceful coexistence of states with different political and economic systems."³⁰ These missions expressed the Poland's view of the fundamental meaning and sense of the creation and functioning of the Warsaw Pact. All of this pact's actions have so far upheld this conviction and the pact statements made 30 years ago have completely kept their meaning.

Thus, in the past 40 years, Poland has actively participated in the creation of a system of bilateral defensive alliances and a multilateral defensive alliance. Both of these systems of alliance coexist and complement each other. For Poland, these are above all systems guaranteeing the inviolability of its borders on the Oder and Neisse. Any sort of armed attack against these borders can activate the defensive potential of the other 6 allies.³¹ In its more than 1000 years of history, our nation has never had such a favorable situation as now.

Constitutional premises and the concrete interests of the nation have determined that our country, from the first moments of its independence, has taken an active part in creating the foundations for a lasting peace and international security both in Europe and throughout the world. The problem of peace and security was so crucial that not long after the cessation of military action against the Third Reich, the cooperation between the states of the antinazi coalition took a turn for the worse and the recent agreements establishing the foundations for postwar peace in Europe and the world totally violated. In the case of the first, the spirit and letter of the Yalta and Potsdam conferences were violated and the latter violated the United Nations Charter.

Within a surprisingly short amount of time, our nation was able to state its position on key contemporary problems, especially the problems of war and peace. In complete acknowledgement of the existence of fundamental conflicts such as the rivalry between socialism and capitalism, Poland, even during periods of the greatest international tension, consistently spoke out against the spread of these conflicts to international relations and especially against their settlement through the use of force. Peaceful coexistence between states of different political order became the common currency of the foreign policy Poland was realizing in close coordination with the other socialist states. This credo of Polish foreign policy was particularly important whenever dark clouds began to gather over the world and the western policy of militant

anticommunist divided Europe and the world to a point of confrontation. Addressing the second session of the United Nations General Assembly on 17 September 1947, Zygmunt Modzelewski, Poland's foreign minister at that time, strongly emphasized that: "In the name of the Polish government, I will once again say that this government will use any means to counter attempts to divide the world and especially Europe into two camps and that it will not allow Poland to be closed off by the iron curtain so mysteriously erected by certain elements that have been disappointed in their efforts to bring Poland under their control."³² The Leninist concept of peaceful coexistence was accepted in Poland to be the leading principle of foreign policy, as the one rational concept for the complexities of modern times.

With regard to Europe, the attention and activity of Polish foreign policy was concentrated on strengthening the Yalta and Potsdam arrangements. Since the Western states had withdrawn themselves from any efforts to realize the main decrees of these conferences, Poland saw the greatest danger to not only its own security but also to peace on the whole European continent. Looking at the international situation of the second half of the 1940's and the 1950's from the perspective of the present day, we must admit that the serious fears of those times were not at all unfounded. The remilitarization of West Germany, the formation of military blocks, division of Europe and the rejection of our borders along the Oder and Neisse could promise no good. The reaction of Poland and the other socialist countries to the evident growth of danger was the previously-described actions to prevent the worst thing from happening. These were really actions intended to revive the harmonious cooperation of the nations of the anti-Nazi coalition and to restore European channels for cooperation and development on the basis of a general European system of collective security making possible the gradual elimination of force from relations between European states.³³ As Wladyslaw Gomułka formulated the concept: "Only the regulation of relations between socialist and capitalist states on the basis of peaceful coexistence can give us the prospects of lasting peace in Europe...The point of departure here must be the definite conclusion of the period of war and the drawing of all conclusions on postwar development thus the universal and international legal recognition of the territorial and political status quo. Only in this way can the foreground be cleared for the future establishment of a general European system for collective security to replace the present division of Europe into military blocks and to guarantee the security of all peoples and states on the basis of principles of equality, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity."³⁴ "We are convinced that peaceful coexistence is a historical necessity for the further development of all humanity," said Minister S. Skrzyszewski in 1954.³⁵ In Poland's opinion, "the United Nations should absolutely not allow any one group of states to create blocks against other UN members."³⁶

Poland recognized that "...one of the most important tasks of its foreign policy was to make all possible efforts to reduce tensions and to create conditions for constructive coexistence between nations of different forms of government in accordance with the living interests and fervent aspirations of the people and the needs of peaceful and successful development of the nation..."³⁷ Poland's interpretation of the concept of peaceful coexistence was clear, simple and relevant to the living interests of the people and state.

Wladyslaw Gomulka said on this subject: "We are guided in our foreign policy by the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence between states. This principle stipulates the renunciation of the instrument of war in relations between all states and the solving of troublesome international problems through negotiation. It stipulates defined cooperation between states of different social systems, the maintenance of normal trade relations between them and cultural, scientific and touristic cooperation. At the same time, peaceful coexistence requires that states mutually respect a series of principles, long-recognized by international law, such as sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and absolute prohibition of interference in the internal affairs of other states. In order to settle troublesome international problems, it is necessary to negotiate mutual agreements protecting the interests of the effected parties...

"Such premises formed the basis for our nation's full support of Soviet propositions, in particular their proposals for a solution to the problem of Germany and the creation of European collective security. These premises were also a point of departure for many original initiatives, especially those proposed by Poland in the 1950's and 1960's. The focus of interest here was the elimination of the dangers of rearmament. The growth of widespread political and conceptual activity on a nuclear arms ban in the center of Europe (the Rapacki plan) and a nuclear freeze (Gomulka plan) is a clear example of this trend in our diplomatic activity."³⁸ Both propositions, despite the fact that they were not implemented in the form prescribed by the original initiatives, did play a significant role. They have also brought our country much international recognition.

The second half of the 1960's and the decade of the 1970's became a period in which the structure and practices of the cold war were overcome. This took place on our continent especially. In August 1975, the signing in Helsinki of the Final Act of the Conference on European Security and Cooperation preceded a Polish proposition submitted by Minister Adam Rapacki to convene a general European meeting on these matters. The historical meeting of the highest representatives of 35 states in the capital of Finland was preceded by a long and uncommonly complicated process of normalization of relations between states in Europe. Our nation played an important role in this process.³⁹ Even in later years when certain western countries returned to cold war confrontation, Poland, along with the other socialist nations, did everything to restore the previous dynamism to detente. This is clearly illustrated by the annals of the difficult meetings of the Final Act signatories in Belgrade and Madrid and the course of conferences by these states in Stockholm.⁴⁰

An essential element of Poland's activity in the building of lasting security on our continent is its participation in the Vienna negotiations on reductions of armed forces and arms in Central Europe. As far as their territorial and partly ideological scope goes, these negotiations have their origin in the Rapacki and Gomulka plans. Our country agreed that the disarmament agreements made during these negotiations also cover Polish territory and Polish armed forces. Our authorities have systematically demonstrated their willingness to go along with bilateral disarmament.⁴¹

For understandable reasons, Poland's foreign policy over the last 40 years has concentrated on European affairs. This is because it cannot be forgotten that our country has been the battlefield in almost every European war. The logic of modern military doctrine and arms systems do not give rise to the least hope that this would not again be the case were an armed conflict to break out in Europe again. Everything points to the fact that in Poland's policy, the situation in Europe is regarded separately from the chief events, phenomena and trends in other parts of the world, especially with regard to the principles of war and peace. As a founding member of the United Nations, Poland has very often used this forum to present its own points of view on the questions of world peace and security.⁴² Poland's focus of interest in debates at the United Nations has been especially devoted to the elimination of weapons of mass destruction. Our nation has presented many proposals on this problem to the General Assembly and other UN organizations. As early as the United Nations' first session in 1946, the Polish foreign minister of that time, Zygmunt Modzelewski, presented a resolution calling on all members of this organization to eliminate atomic and other weapons of mass destruction from their arsenals and to use nuclear power research for peaceful purposes alone.

Polish recommendations and special reports on the subject of the effects of the use of nuclear arms, the economic consequences of arms and biological or chemical weapons were received with the highest interest by the United Nations member states. This commitment to international peace, security and disarmament was certainly the reason for Poland's three-time membership in the Security Council and its involvement in practically all UN organizations handling disarmament talks. All of this activity has given our country much more prestige among the people of the world than its population, size and economic importance would indicate. Poland's commitment to peace has also made unquestionable contributions to the preservation of world peace. As Minister of Foreign Affairs Stefan Olszowski said, "in commitment to world detente, good relations between states and cooperation in the establishment of world security, we see great important in strengthening Poland's authority and position in the world."⁴³

There have obviously been more areas of interest in our foreign policy over the last 40 years. For example, economic problems have made up an ever greater part of all of our foreign service's activity. However, the most important policy problems were undoubtedly international recognition of people's power in Poland, recognition of Poland's western borders, Poland's security and the security of Europe in general. Some of these problems took precedence over the others for only a certain amount of time while others have remained important to this day and continue to take priority over the leading everyday problems. One of the problems that temporarily dominated foreign policy was the recognition of Poland's new government by the West. This was the number one problem in the first few years after the war. The problem of the Oder and Neisse borders lasted until December 1970 and even beyond, to the conclusion of the Conference on European Security and Cooperation in August 1975. The problems of constant importance to our foreign policy involve the actual questions of the viability of our alliances. In the present difficult international situation, the factors that brought about the creation of the Warsaw Pact will certainly remain important. For many years to come, a priority of Polish foreign policy will undoubtedly continue to be European security and world peace. The assurance of external conditions for the security of our country

remains the fundamental task of Polish foreign policy. These conditions can be created by preserving Poland's alliances and by acting most effectively to build an international structure for peace, detente and security based on nonmilitary factors.

In its appeal for the defense of peace, the National Conference of PZPR Delegates wrote, "Socialist Poland, in accordance with the basic interests of our people and the tradition consistently realized through our foreign policy, will spare no efforts to continue making a constructive contribution to maintaining a structure for peace in Europe, to strengthen world security and to develop broad and equal international cooperation".⁴⁴ This trend of Polish activity in the international arena has undoubtedly found the unambiguous support of the entire nation and Poland's foreign policy over the last 40 years has been unambiguously approved by all compatriots.

FOOTNOTES

1. Lenin, V.I. "Foreign policy of the Russian revolution", Works, vol 25, p 77.
2. Lenin, V.I. "On the caricature of Marxism", Works, vol 23, p 35.
3. Lenin, V.I. "The looming catastrophe", Works, vol 25, p 39, Warsaw, KiW, 1961.
4. Immeasurably interesting discussion of this subject can be found in articles and speeches by the foreign affairs minister of 1945-1951, Z. Modzelewski, in his volume "Poland's foreign policy" [Polityka zagraniczna Polski], Warsaw, PWN, 1960.
5. See E. Gajda, "Foreign policy, 1944-1974" [Polityka zagraniczna 1944-1974], Warsaw, Wyd. MON, 1974.
6. "From the Polish National Liberation Committee to the Government of National Unity (Collection of documents)" [Od Polskiego Komitetu Wyzwolenia Narodowego do Rządu Jedności Narodowej (Zbiór dokumentów)], Warsaw, 1945, p 49.
7. Extensive analysis of Poland's activities in the international arena during the first postwar years can be found in W.T. Kowalski's publication, "The Polish Republic's foreign policy in 1944-1947" [Polityka zagraniczna RP 1944-1947], KiW, 1971.
8. Buczman, L., Gajda, E., "Polish-Czech relations, 1944-1970" [Stosunki polsko-czeskie w latach 1944-1970], SPRAWY MIĘDZYNARODOWE no 7, 1970, pp 86-108.
9. See W.T. Kowalski's "The USSR and the borders on the Oder and Lusatian Neisse, 1941-1945" [ZSRR a granica na Odrze i Nysie Łużyckiej 1941-1945], Warsaw, 1965.
10. The memorandum contained documented argumentation in support of the Oder-Lusatian Neisse border. For the text of this memorandum, see SPRAWY MIĘDZYNARODOWE no 7-8/1969, pp 97, 98.

11. The first legal interpretation in Polish scholarly literature of the western borders was given in A. Klafkowski's work, "The legal basis for the Oder-Neisse borders according to the Yalta and Potsdam conferences" [Podstawy prawne granicy Odra-Nysa na tle umow: jaltanskich i poczdamskich], Poznan, 1947.

12. Announcement of the Government of the Polish Republic, Washington, 16 October 1945, see "Collection of Documents" [Zbior Dokumentow], no 10, Warsaw, 1960, PISM, pp 1624-1625.

13. Speech by Wladyslaw Gomulka, chairman of the Polish delegation to the fifteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York, 27 September 1960. See ZBIOR DOKUMENTOW no 10, Warsaw, 1960, PISM pp 1624, 1625.

14. See "The Polish People's Republic and the German Federal Republic -- balance of mutual relations. Problems and prospects for normalization." [Polska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa, Republika Federalna Niemiec -- bilans stosunkow wzajemnych. Problemy i perspektywy normalizacji], Warsaw, 1979, PISM, p 318.

15. The Final Act of the Conference on European Security and Cooperation (offprint), SPRAWY MIEDZYNARODOWE, no 10, 1975.

16. The unambiguously formulated statement of close allied relations to the Soviet Union was included in: 1) the November 1943 program document of the PPR titled "Why we are fighting" [O co walczymy]; 2) the 10 June 1943 Declaration of the Union of Polish Patriots; 3) the 1 January 1944 program declaration of the Polish National Liberation Committee. For more on this subject, see W.T. Kowalski's "The Polish Republic's foreign policy in 1944-1947" [Polityka zagraniczna RP 1944-1947], Warsaw, KiW, 1974, and "The Concepts of Polish foreign policy in 1942-1944" [Koncepcje polskiej polityki zagranicznej w latach 1942-1944], SPRAWY MIEDZYNARODOWE, no 2, 1964.

17. For more on this subject, see J. Tyranowski, "The alliance treaties of the Polish People's Republic" [Traktaty sojusznicze Polski Ludowej], Warsaw, 1972.

18. For the full text of the Friendship, Mutual Aid and Military Cooperation Treaty, see the collection "International law and diplomatic history. Collection of documents" [Prawo miedzynarodowe i historia dyplomatyczna. Wybor dokumentow], edited by L. Gelberg, vol 3, Warsaw, 1960, p 90.

19. DZIENNIK USTAW, 1945, no 47.

20. For the text of the Polish-Soviet treaty of 8 April 1965, see DZIENNIK USTAW, 1965, no 20, item 130.

21. DZIENNIK USTAW, 1947, no 26, item 100.

22. DZIENNIK USTAW, 1948, no 7, item 47.

23. DZIENNIK USTAW, 1949, no 2, item 6.

24. DZIENNIK USTAW, 1948, no 51, item 403.

25. DZIENNIK USTAW, 1959, no 11, item 114.

26. See J. Tyranowski, pp 33, 34.

27. "The Warsaw Pact -- its establishment and activities, 1955-1974. Collection of Documents", [Układ Warszawski -- powstanie i działalność 1955-1974. Wybór dokumentów], edited by W. Multan, Warsaw, 1975, PISM, p 36.

28. See "The Warsaw Pact -- its establishment and activities, 1955-1974. Collection of documents", W. Multan, Warsaw, 1975, PISM, p 36.

29. Interview by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers Jozef Cyrankiewicz for the journal NOWE CZASY, Warsaw, 21 May 1955.

30. Speech by Chairman of the Council of Ministers Jozef Cyrankiewicz before the Warsaw Pact Member States' Political Advisory Committee, Prague, 27 January 1956.

31. ZBIOR DOKUMENTOW no 1, Warsaw 1956, PISM, pp 52, 53. An interesting discussion of the relationships between these systems is presented in J. Tyranowski's "Legal foundations of Poland's security" [Podstawy prawne bezpieczeństwa Polski], a report made to a scholarly conference titled "International factors in Poland's security", organized by PISM and PSKSiWE, Warsaw, 7 May 1964.

32. Speech by the chairman of the Polish Delegation, S. Skrzyszewski, to the ninth session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York, 4 October 1954. See ZBIOR DOKUMENTOW no 1, Warsaw 1954, PISM, p 266.

33. The socialist concept of collective European security as seen in the second half of the 1950's is presented in M. Lachs' work "The System of collective security and security and peace in Europe" [System bezpieczeństwa zbiorowego a sprawa bezpieczeństwa i pokoju w Europie], Warsaw, 1955.

34. Speech by **first secretary** of the PZPR Central Committee on the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the victory over fascism, Wrocław, 3 May 1970. For the text of this speech, see ZBIOR DOKUMENTOW no 5, Warsaw, 1970, PISM, pp 737, 738.

35. Speech by the chairman of the Polish Delegation, S. Skrzyszewski, to the plenary ninth session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York.

36. Speech by the chairman of the Polish Delegation and Minister of Foreign Affairs S. Skrzyszewski to the tenth session of the United Nations General Assembly, San Francisco, 23 June 1955. See ZBIOR DOKUMENTOW no 6, Warsaw 1955, PISM, pp 1222, 1223.

37. Speech by Minister of Foreign Affairs A. Rapacki to the Sejm Foreign Affairs Commission, Warsaw, 15 December 1957. Adam Rapacki, "Speeches, articles and interviews, 1957-1966" [Przemówienia, artykuły, wywiady 1957-1966], KIS, Warsaw, 1966, pp 33, 34.

38. See W. Multan, "Problems of European disarmament, 1945-1975" [Problemy rozbrojenia europejskiego 1945-1975], Warsaw, PWN, 1979, p 122.

39. For more information on the commitment of our country to the European Conference on Security and Cooperation, see "CSCE -- A Polish View", Warsaw, 1975, PISM, and W. Molendowski, "European collective security in Polish foreign policy" [Europejskie bezpieczeństwo zbiorowe w polskiej polityce zagranicznej], Poznan, 1983.

40. See A.D. Rotfeld, "The Madrid Meeting of the Conference on European Security and Cooperation: dialogue on ways to trust and security in Europe" [Spotkanie Madryckie KBWE: dialog o środkach zaufania i bezpieczeństwa w Europie]. In "History of the development of the socialist states [Dzieje rozwoju państw socjalistycznych], vol 1, 1983, pp 113-136.

41. "Vienna conference on bilateral reduction of armed forces and arms in Central Europe. Collection of documents, 1973-1978" [Rokowania wiedeńskie w sprawie wzajemnej redukcji sił zbrojnych i zbrojen w Europie Środkowej, wybór dokumentów 1973-1978]. Edited by Wojciech Multan, Warsaw, 1980, PISM.

42. For details on this subject, see A. Abraszewski, "Poland and the United Nations" [Polska w ONZ], Warsaw, 1975, I**rpress.

43. Speech by Minister of Foreign Affairs Stefan Olszowski, Warsaw, 5 November 1973. For the text, see ZBIOR DOKUMENTÓW no 11, Warsaw, 1973, PISM, pp 1711, 1712.

44. TRYBUNA LUDU, 19 March 1984.

12261

CSO:2600/1192

SUGGESTIONS FOR AMENDING CONSTITUTION ADVANCED

Belgrade NEDELJNE INFORMATIVNE NOVINE in Serbo-Croatian No 1751, 22 Jul 84
pp 12-13

[Article by Stevan Niksic: "A Big Bite"]

[Text] Work is continuing on critical analysis of the functioning of the political system. It is going slowly, but it is moving.

Two years ago when the decision was made to thoroughly reassess the political system in order to see what was not working in it and why it appeared that that would be easier than it has now later turned out to be. It seemed that there was a far greater degree of the consensus necessary to beginning that job. That it all could have been done much faster and more simply. When that job was started, it turned out that there were serious differences.

But now, after a series of debates, it is evident that even those who were skeptical even at the very idea of possibly having to change anything in the present set of normative instruments in the political system are today viewing this much more cool-headedly. Time has had its effect.

At the very outset (see "Working Bases of the Program for Work on Critical Analysis of the Political System of Socialist Self-Management in the SFRY") it was imagined that pursuit of common interests in the Federation set forth in the constitution would be analyzed in the first round of topics. At the end of May the Federal Council for the Social System, following lengthy preparations, took up the question about how common interests are being realized in the Federation through the SFRY Assembly, the SFRY State Presidency, the FEC [Federal Executive Council] and federal administrative agencies.

Last week the Council took up another topic in what is the first case folder: realization of common interests in the Federation through associated labor.

The Bases of the Conflict

The discussion has been fairly "thin," mainly general and woven from repetitions of well-known principles ("associated labor ought to have the decisive role in establishing and realizing common interests at all levels and in all forms of social decisionmaking" and the like) which are not implemented in practice.

The members of the Federal Council were mostly united and agreed in their views on the sort of position and role associated labor ought to have in the Yugoslav Federation. But the actual position of associated labor, it seems, largely determines the real scope and quality of discussion on that topic itself. The members of the Federal Council, however, showed much greater interest in a topic which was on the agenda of their previous meeting and which concerned the present relations in federal bodies and agencies (the SFRY Assembly, the SFRY State Presidency, the FEC, etc.), the Federation's relationship with the republics and provinces in both directions, which was discussed once again at this meeting. Polemical sparks flared up and there were confrontations of completely opposite views on this topic; this is where many specific interests crisscross (which are not always necessarily the interests of associated labor).

Milan Kucan, member of the Presidium of the LCY Central Committee, noted, probably with good reason and with an overtone of polemical intimation (although he did not say to whom or why it was to be addressed), that "it is not true that all institutional solutions in the system are in good order and that only behavior should be changed:

"Without changes in the arrangements for financing expanded reproduction and decisionmaking in that area, changes concerning the credit and monetary system, the banking system, the financing of government and social service expenditure, income tabulation and accounting, the tax system, and certain other fields, as called for by the stabilization program, the obstacles in the state-ownership relations standing in the way of integration and the pooling of labor and capital across the borders of opstinas and the republics and provinces cannot be consistently removed on a constitutional basis," Kucan feels. At the same time he notes that the dependence of associated labor on centers of political decisionmaking has not been decreasing in the recent past, but has in fact been growing.

Kucan is in any case convinced that the question of who will appropriate the function of acting owner of the resources of society has not been altogether settled in practice: the working class (the workers in associated labor), as the constitution envisages, or centers of bureaucratic and technocratic power which have become independent and whose power is based on state ownership.... That is the essence of the class conflict in the present stage of development of socialist self-management, and it obviously cannot be resolved without direct confrontation of the partial interests which have been objectively brought about.

Speaking on the right ways and wrong ways of linking associated labor together and at the same time about its destiny in the system as it is today, Bozin Jovanovic talked mainly in examples. He recalled that last year 4 million tons of domestic steel were exported, though it is needed by the domestic industry, and immediately the same amount of the same kind of steel had to be imported, except that, of course, a higher price was paid for the imported steel....

Steel and the Constitution

Albreht Roman had objections to the report on the views and proposals presented at the previous meeting of the Council; he felt that the republics and provinces had been unjustifiably placed in the defendant's box in certain assessments (noted down in that report), and at his insistence the report was edited to state that those were not positions which the Council had adopted.

"Anyone who thinks that the constitution should be amended must state precisely which article of the constitution and why it should be amended.... We receive material in which it says that the ethnic is constituted in the republic and the class attributes in the Federation," Roman said, noting that such opinions are utterly unacceptable.

As for those who advocate changes in the constitution--it is obvious that there are some of them even in this Federal Council. At that meeting, for example, Caslav Strahinjc explicitly said that certain provisions of the constitution related to the status of workers in associated labor and the status of the OOUR [basic organization of associated labor] should be amended. This was followed, however, by a very interesting debate between A. Roman and Zdravko Tomc, since by all appearances Tomc takes a different view of realization of the present constitutional conception of the Yugoslav Federation than that of Roman.

Tomc, appealing to the constitution, recalled that the Yugoslav Federation was never a simple sum of republics as sovereign states and autonomous provinces, but something more than that. But, he says (Kucan spoke along the same lines before him) that in practice the concept of the Federation is realized very simply and that in this only its government component is manifested. In his judgment A. Roman was actually advocating that that one-sided conception of the Federation be carried to the end: that there might not be any sort of direct linkage at the level of Yugoslavia bypassing the republic and province, so that all interests must be mediated through the interests of the republic and province, that the class interests of the workers would be manifested only up to the level of the republics (and provinces), and then they would agree with one another on all these matters at the level of Yugoslavia.

There followed a mutual clarification of views, after which the only thing that was clear was that those two (and it seems certain others as well) think differently on this point.

What Is in Dispute

The report (the one already mentioned) from the previous debate in the Council on realization of common interests in the Federation is the best evidence of the existence of differing views and of the dimensions of those differences. It noted, for example, that participants in the work of the Council had differing visions of the scope and importance of the principle of decisionmaking by mandatory consensus of the representatives of the republics and provinces in the Federation.

It was noted in the preliminary analyses that there is a pronounced tendency to significantly broaden that principle even to those matters for which the constitution did not specify it (in the proceedings of the SFRY Assembly, the Federal Executive Council, federal administrative agencies, and also in enforcement of federal laws), which result in a slowdown if not a blockade in decisionmaking and execution of decisions once made. However, while some--so it states in the report--see serious adverse consequences in this, since it alters the constitutional conception of decisionmaking in federal bodies and agencies, others feel that this is a peripheral matter, that it is being given excessive importance, since its rare application could not jeopardize the realization of common interests.

The greatest differences in opinions among participants in the work of the Council were manifested in connection with the assessment (set forth by the authors of the preliminary analyses) that the constitutional concept of the Federal Chamber of the SFRY Assembly had not been realized, especially with respect to the method of election, the composition and lack of connection of that chamber with the delegate base in proceedings and decisionmaking. Major differences were manifested especially in the assessments of the principal causes of this situation: How to arrive at guidelines on the basis of which the delegates should make decisions in this chamber and get beyond the practice whereby they operate only as "advocates" of the state-political structures of their own republics and provinces?

Some of the participants in the work of the Council felt that this assessment was "unacceptable." However, even those who think that way were still not unified in all respects: some of them insist that the delegates of this chamber are improving connections with their own base exclusively within the horizon of the republic and province, others are inclined to seek solutions even by connecting the delegates of that chamber with forms of activity of the Federal Conference of the SAWPY.

Another group of participants in the debate felt that the principal shortcomings in the operation of the Federal Chamber arise out of the "constitutional incompleteness" of its concept. Which is to say--because the authors of the constitution did not set all that down in a good and precise way. No essential changes in the work of that chamber are possible, then, without the corresponding institutional changes, and that would also require corresponding amendments of the constitution.

There are also many disagreements over the manner of election of the delegates of that chamber, since every delegate in that chamber represents an entire republic or province, which as a practical matter is impossible. According to one opinion, better connections with the delegate base could be established only if the manner of election and delegation were changed, if the delegates, say, were elected in smaller electoral units. But that again would require amending the constitution.

By contrast with this view, a different one was presented whose spokesmen say that the statement is untrue ("nihilistic") to the effect that no one knows what the delegate base of the Federal Chamber is, and they say that we should

free ourselves of the "fetish of electoral democracy," that no sort of smaller electoral units will resolve the problems in relations between the delegates of that chamber and the base, and so on.

As we see, then, it is a big bite. So, presumably, there is nothing unusual in the fact that the job is going the way it is.

7045

CSO: 2800/448

CROATIAN NATIONALISM, 1971 EVENTS REASSESSED

Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 21 Aug 84 pp 19-22

[Interview with Dr Ivan Peric, sociologist and director of the Marxist Center in Split, by Gojko Marinkovic: "An Imposed Interest Is Not a Nationality Interest"; date and place not specified]

[Text] A great deal is said and written about nationalism in our country, usually in political gatherings, in resolutions, conclusions and rallies, but then, of course, in the newspapers as well. However, research on this phenomenon is quite rare, and there are few scientists who are willing, and then presumably also competent, to take up this perpetual topic. Sociology seems to have been avoiding investigation of this way of thinking and this pattern of behavior as though it lacked the strength to take up the challenge, to study the ebbs and flows of nationalism, to concern itself with the roots and consequences of what is referred to in the political vocabulary as our greatest enemy. That is precisely why the public received with great interest the book by Dr Ivan Peric "Suvremeni hrvatski nacionalizam" [Contemporary Croatian Nationalism], published a month ago by the "August Cesarec" Publishing House in Zagreb. This is a monograph whose first edition appeared in 1976, that is, a few years after Croatian nationalism was manifested quite strongly as the "mass movement." Dr Ivan Peric is a sociologist and director of the Marxist Center in Split, and he has so far published several studies in the field of nationalism, among which the one printed in 1973—"Ideja masovnog pokreta u Hrvatskoj" [The Idea of the Mass Movement in Croatia]—stands out.

Peric takes as his point of departure the thesis that nationalism as a way of thought, as a pattern of behavior, and as a movement is based on taking the nationality as the criterion by which all the problems of society are judged. In other words, members of society who are interested in changing relations within it impose as a criterion givens and limitations manifested in the nationality as the sum total of various social realities, and that criterion is constantly operative. Even people who work in the sphere of culture are not immune to this, since culture after all sums up everything that is held in common by the nationality. Nor are people in politics immune to this, since in the end politics expresses itself by compressing the real problems into the common interest of the nationality. Those who are conducting a policy founded on a socialist orientation usually always [sic] attack nationalism as something opposite to socialism, but nationalism penetrates politics as a tendency, and this gives rise to difficulties.

We are offering excerpts from a lengthy interview with Dr Ivan Peric.

[Question] Do you think that the phenomenon is too complicated?

[Answer] Certainly it is complicated. Complexity demands an appropriate treatment, but it seems to me that nationalism is often treated in political life in very oversimplified terms.

[Question] Does it not seem to you that that is exactly the case with the 1971 events and that there are still no real answers to the questions about what actually happened?

[Answer] In Croatia in 1971 nationalism did actually shape and express itself as the dominant tendency, but this does not mean that the real problems of society which were shaped into a nationalistic expression were not contained in all that. As a matter of fact, much of what came to the surface in 1971 and was articulated in the so-called mass movement existed in the form of economic and social problems, so that the university students organized a strike and took the foreign exchange system as the issue. The entire problem was formulated in a nationalistic way, but that does not mean that it did not exist.

[Question] In your book you place nationalism in capitalist society; that is where its roots are, you say that it is an expression of class conflicts. How is it, then, that peace among members of the same nationality is the thesis of every nationalism? How do you explain that discrepancy?

[Answer] The nationality maintains itself as a community through the dominance of certain narrow interests. A balance of all the interests within the nationality is impossible. This imposed interest is expressed in the form of nationalism. In the past that was the interest of the bourgeoisie. However, when the bourgeoisie vanishes from a country's political and economic structure, the mode of reproduction of society shaped by capitalism remains, the system of production and appropriation of the surplus value remains. One segment of society continues to create the surplus, and another continues to alienate it, to distribute it. That appropriation and that distribution under these altered historical conditions are made possible by a fundamental institution which is the pivot of everything, and that is the state. It expresses the community interest; in fact this is a territorialized community interest, and the strata who base their existence on alienation of the surplus value of labor from material production are reproduced in it by means of the state. This, then, is how the domination of interests comes about whereby the nationality is maintained and reproduced as a community. Those who base their very existence on that interest are equated most directly with the nationality as a global community. Expressing itself in that way, the national interest blocks off movements and changes within the nationality and demands a more favorable situation of the nationality relative to the environment.

[Question] Certain interests, then, rise to the level of state interests?

[Answer] To the level of the interests of the nationality, which are presented as those of the state. It is no accident that in 1971 nationalism expressed itself as a demand for national statehood.

[Question] That is one part of nationalism, which we might refer to as class or economic nationalism, but we also have "romantic" nationalism. Is it only a "concomitant" or does it also feed on the first one?

[Answer] It exists without interruption and renews itself without interruption, since that kind of nationalism cannot otherwise renew itself and maintain itself than on a constant preservation and renewal of the tradition. Such processes exist in every nationality. Not a single nationality can shape and maintain its culture unless it constantly appreciates what it has created in the past. But that accentuation of the past may be manifested in a nationalistic way. Let us be clear, we are not talking about rejection of the past, but of its appreciation. Every nationality has its own past, and those social forces which in one phase of historical development become dominant in the nationality. They also take over the legacy created down through the generations and assume responsibility for appreciation of that legacy, that past. However, nationalism is expressed in terms of the approach to the problems of contemporary society from the standpoint of the past. This was particularly manifested in Croatia in 1971. Conceptions which are behind us, which at some time in our past had their place and importance, for example, those of Radic, Starcevic or Supilo, and especially Radic's, were presented as something to go back to and to be used as guides in solving our contemporary problems.

[Question] But isn't that the reason why we gladly give up Radic, and then others make him their banner? We give up many things from our past, as though the Croatian people had behind it a history of only 40 or 50 years. Yet it is well known that a people without history is not a people.

[Answer] That is a consequence of the sectarian approach to appreciation of the past. To be specific, let us see what happens with, say, Starcevic. Some people now say that he was a precursor of Ustashism, but actually Kersovani and Cesarec fought fiercely with the Frankists immediately before the war, arguing that Starcevic had nothing to do with the Ustashi and the Ustasha movement. Much the same is true of Radic. The Cathedral conducts a mass for the dead on the 50th anniversary of his death, although we know that he was fiercely anticlerical and was in constant conflict with the church although he was a believer. Yet we do not even take notice of the anniversary of his death.

They are forever bringing back Ban [governor] Jelacic, and many things of all kinds along with him. They bring him back in order to discredit Marxism, since Marx had bad things to say about the South Slavs in connection with the events in 1848. We still have an uncritical attitude both toward Marx and toward Jelacic. Toward each of them, of course, in a different way. Marx was mistaken in his assessment of the Croats and South Slavs and 1848, that should not be passed over in silence, nor does that diminish the greatness of his work. But that error of Marx's does not mean that Jelacic was not in fact a counterrevolutionary. For example, in Zvano Crnja's book "Kulturna povijest Hrvata" [The Cultural History of the Croats] I have read that Jelacic went against Hungary because the Hungarians disputed the rights of the Croats. This has to be taken with great reserve, since Jelacic did not wage war against the Hungarians on Croatian soil, but near Budapest, and that is

something altogether different. But at the time of his march against Hungary Vienna was in a state of rebellion. There was an uprising of residents of the city and university students, and in the face of that uprising the emperor and his entire entourage fled to Olomouc. Jelacic went to Vienna with his army to suppress that rebellion, and Crnja explains this by saying that the rebels in Bec had a negative attitude toward the Croats. What he doesn't say is that Jelacic was defending the imperial court, that is, the Hapsburgs, who were denying the Croats the most basic rights, for example, the right to unify Croatia and Dalmatia.

Thus our nationalists do not celebrate our past, they bring it all back indiscriminately. That is in fact what happened in 1971, when an entire movement was initiated to restore the monument to Jelacic on the Square of the Republic.

[Question] Let us go back to 1971. Doesn't it seem to you that the report issued from the 28th Meeting of the Croatian LC Central Committee, in which a majority of the Croatian leadership at that time resigned, was a bit one-sided, that it does not give a true picture of that time, that it is devoid of the dramatic aspect of the events, that antinationalistic points were omitted? It would seem that there had been none. This does an injustice to the people who opposed nationalism.

[Answer] That is probably so, but we should not forget that the purpose of that report was to establish the hotbeds of nationalism, and it restricted itself to that. When that report is read today, it leaves an impression of one-sidedness, nor does it even indicate the hotbeds of resistance. To be sure, one was identified. That was within the Central Committee itself, in the Executive Committee. That, of course, was not all. But it should be taken into account that the report had to make an assessment as to how matters stood in the Central Committee and around it. Which accounts for that one-sidedness.

[Question] But even you in your book stand by the assessments made in precisely that report. Don't you think that an additional effort is needed to investigate what actually happened?

[Answer] I felt that the year 1971 was important because the lawful or tolerant expression of nationalism was facilitated in that year. I think that that was the essential thing, while the 21st Meeting of the LCY Presidium and the 23d Meeting of the Croatian LC Central Committee, and the actions which followed, drove nationalism beyond the pale and thereby ended one phase of its expression. What happened later occurred in a different way.

[Question] It has been 15 years since the 10th Meeting of the Croatian LC Central Committee, which many call controversial, since at one and the same time it issued harsh criticism of nationalism and at the same time opened the door wide to it.

[Answer] The 10th meeting is usually judged to be an event in the political life of Croatia which allowed the advance of nationalism in legalized or tolerant form. At the meeting itself, which I myself attended, and in its documents no one's appeal for nationalism can be found. On the contrary, you will

find many antinationalistic tones. The 10th meeting mistakenly accentuated certain things, above all in the attitude toward Zanko. Zanko can and should be talked about objectively today. No legal party leadership could tolerate what he did at that time. That is, he published a number of articles in BORBA against Croatian nationalism in which he announced to the broadest public that he himself was fighting against it and that he had the blessing of the League of Communists of Croatia. The Croatian LC Central Committee had to react to that.

However, whether that had to be raised to the level of a plenum or should have been dealt with entirely in some other group and in a different tone is another question. The late Vladimir Bakarić once said that that plenum was prepared so that Croatia could present its views on relations in the Federation, but at this point the two things got mixed. Zanko, who was attacking Croatian nationalism, was put in the defendant's box, and this was debated for 3 days, and what the plenum was actually supposed to debate ended up after all in the background. I analyzed later everything that was said at that meeting, including the introductory address of Savka Dabčević-Kučar, and it is difficult to find nationalistic tones in that material. But the plenum did create a climate and did make it possible for the nationalistic tendency to become active. When the nationalistic forces realized that Zanko had been criticized, then they concluded from that that more favorable opportunities were being opened up for their activity, and once that got going, then it was difficult to stop them. I know that Mika Tripalo himself asked for urgent action when Cicak was elected prorector and that he said that this was a case of both clericalism and nationalism.

[Question] But just a few months later Dražen Budisa was the official candidate of the LC for president of the League of Zagreb University Students.

[Answer] And not only that. People were enrolled in the party who had declared in public that they were religious.

[Question] In our political experience it is a rare case for a republic to offer its view of the Federation. Is this out of fear of reactions, or was this not necessary at that time?

[Answer] That was a case of examining the functioning of the economic and social system, and certain knowledge was gained which was difficult to present through the normal channels of the Federal Assembly. Perhaps it is not so well known that after the 10th meeting a meeting of the Executive Bureau was held on Brioni; it lasted 3 days, and that meeting was one of the things it debated. Criticism of the Croatian leadership was expressed, there was also talk about relations within the Federation, but the right of the Croatian leadership to emphasize this problem was not disputed. Kardelj presented an assessment of the 10th meeting and he pointed out certain contradictions and cases of vagueness in the very formulation of the demands by the Croatian leadership: in one and the same breath they call for the Federation to renounce resources on behalf of the economy and for funds to be set up for the credit financing of exports of ships and equipment.

[Question] The 1971 events are directly related in time to the Brioni Plenum and the year 1968. Are there any cause-and-effect connections?

[Answer] It is difficult to indicate the depth of those connections on-the-spot like this. Certainly the phenomena should be evaluated in the context of overall development. Bakaric once pointed up the process whereby the nationalities were becoming more independent in the sense of becoming stronger through self-management, through the development of material, cultural and scientific potential. He said at that time that no nationality wants to be a province any longer, but rather is calling for more rights and responsibilities for its own development and for the development of the whole. In that statement, which dates before 1968, Bakaric pointed to the augmented and developed forces within each nationality. It was only a question of the conditions under which this would be manifested and the way in which it would be expressed.

[Question] Unfortunately, we know in what way. But when the year 1971 is mentioned, nationalism is often mentioned only in Croatia.

[Answer] In Slovenia we had the so-called highway affair. That was also nationalism. But nationalism on that occasion did not directly mobilize broader forces. The political structures in Slovenia were mobilized at that time on a nationalistic course.

[Question] But the situation in Slovenia was also different.

[Answer] Even today there are marked manifestations of nationalism in Slovenia; they are showing up with a lag. Which is not to play down what happened in Croatia. Nationalism in Croatia in 1971 was the strongest source of crisis in Yugoslavia with respect to its intensity and its proportions. But when it was cleared up in Croatia, it became evident that it also had to be cleared up elsewhere--in Serbia, Slovenia, Macedonia and other communities.

[Question] Nationalism is always there, it is a latent danger, all people are "bloody under the skin," but it has been the custom to say that nationalism is still above all "at the service" of the politicians, and that actually it does not exist unless it is being used for political purposes.

[Answer] Nationalism is indeed a political phenomenon, and until it becomes that in a definite way, it is not visible; it stays within the "permitted" limits. It is always striving to become a relevant political phenomenon and the question is when and under what conditions it will break into politics.

[Question] Is it fed above all from above?

[Answer] That is again difficult to say, since the top level can also suppress it. It depends on what the real problems of a society or within a nationality are, on the intensity with which they impose themselves, and whether appropriate solutions are found. Should they not be found, then these problems are imposed even by certain forces interested in giving them a nationalistic shape. Specifically, today the Catholic Church, which in and of itself

is not a source of nationalism, if it wants to make itself felt on the public scene, then it has no other way than to go back in that direction, which is the only one in which it can exist. To return to the past, to tradition, to those values which it has always shaped, and to try to impose those values as the sole values of the nationality. If the social forces in the nationality find opportunities to solve their problems in a socialist way, then that pushes the nationalists onto the margins of social events.

[Question] Debates are still going on in our country about "national economies." Attempts are being made to pass off everything through the arguments about the national economies, but doesn't it seem to you that the constitutional thesis has been "fleeced"?

[Answer] That question we either blow up too big or we oversimplify. There is one economy, Yugoslavia is a unified economic and customs territory. That has been stated in all our constitutions, and it also stands in the one which is in effect. We are in favor of the right of the producers to communicate directly with one another, to exchange goods, to enter into association, to solicit business, and to do everything which a community contains. All of those flows are nevertheless mediated through politics, and if we know that all the associations in which the workers are involved are situated in a certain space--the space of the nationality, which differs in many respects from other space, we get to the essence of the problem. It is actually not possible to eliminate mediation, but the question is how much of it is needed. As soon as there is an intermediary in economic flows, then certain types of potential group together, and that grouping tends to resemble a national or republic economy. If that kind of "republic economy" were reduced to an appropriate form of mediation in order to accentuate development and on behalf of harmonious utilization of all the types of potential in that area, then it would not be aimed at separation from the others, it would have its own purpose and function. The essential thing is for that mediation not to threaten the basic principle of the system, and that is the unity of the Yugoslav economic and customs territory. If that principle is jeopardized, those economies demonstrate their destructive nature.

[Question] We in Croatia have a great many problems: debts, illiquidity of the banks, and petroleum. Isn't that space for nationalism?

[Answer] All kinds of things can be politicized--petroleum, debts, tourism, the foreign exchange regime. All of those things can open up space for nationalism, if these problems are taken out of their economic and social context, and emphasis is put on their nationality aspect.

[Question] We usually say that our working class is against nationalism, but this is to forget that the interest of the class is not unified, and that there may be conflicts between segments of the class.

[Answer] It is clear that the class is divided. I recall Marx's idea expressed in "German Ideology": individuals make up a class only insofar as they must wage common struggle against another class; otherwise they behave as competitors toward one another. The parts of our working class in fact behave

like competitors, but in them there is also a persistent resistance to nationalism, since nationalism imposes upon them a spirit of community in which the interest of the upper strata is dominant. This does not mean that the workers may not even accept nationalism nor that they cannot be led to positions of nationalism, but that it is their interest to change relations within the nationality

[Question] But what would happen if they were offered an ideology which does change the relations, specifically the nationalistic ideology, as happened in Kosovo?

[Answer] I do not preclude even that possibility, but in that case they are working against their existential interests; in that case they have been ideologized from outside, and their point of departure is not something which comes out of their own existence, but from something imposed upon them.

[Question] But the problem is much more complex. That is, the class interest can at the same time be nationalistic as well.

[Answer] The nationality question is not socially neutral, but in that case those relations should be grasped, and the essence should not be concealed. Vlado Gotovac said back in 1970 that Croatia was a standard by which to measure everything and that nothing could be changed for others until it was done for Croatia. It is one thing to say that there is a problem of shipbuilding and that it should be solved and another one that the problem of shipbuilding is restyled from an economic and social problem to a nationality problem. The foreign exchange regime can also be raised as a question of facilitating normal economic flows, an issue that could be more relevant to one region than another, but it can also be presented as the concern of this or that nationality. In the latter case a socioeconomic problem is politicized in a manner which stimulates nationalism.

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RENEWAL OF INTEREST IN RELIGION AMONG YOUNG ANALYZED

Belgrade NEDELJNE INFORMATIVNE NOVINE in Serbo-Croatian No 1752, 29 Jul 84
pp 18-20

[Article by Slobodanka Ast: "Angel Bite"]

[Text] Certain lucid observers have concluded that the points most frequented on the map of Belgrade this year have been Red Star Stadium, the Sava Convention Center where Jennifer Beals has been performing "Flashdance" for months, the Orthodox Cathedral on Good Friday on the eve of Easter, and Marx and Engels Square on 25 May during the big rock festival. The principal performers and the bulk of the public were young people.

All of this, of course, fits in to the iconography of the city, but why is it there are so many people in the cathedral on Good Friday?

How accurate are certain diagnoses to the effect that more and more young people are going to church and that young people are becoming more interested in religion?

Actually there are very opposed opinions today about the piety phenomenon--from those who say that the church is experiencing a profound crisis to statements about a new flowering of religious faith. The pilgrimage to Rome made by about 200 schoolchildren from Dubrovnik who went off to visit the pope in the middle of the school year and to attend a world meeting of Catholic youth is one of the arguments to support the latter assertion. And one of the most recent surveys of the relationship between young people and religion in the Subotica area supports this argument: it turned out that 41 percent of secondary schoolchildren there are religious....

A New Wave?

So, has religion undergone a revitalization after the wave of secularization which lasted several years?

An answer to this question is offered by several surveys, of which the most relevant seems to be the analysis made over several years by Srdjan Vrcan, Split University professor. If we compress some of professor's conclusions into telegraphese, we might say that the attitude of young people toward

religion is actually ambiguous. That is, it is obvious that on the average young people are less and less religious to the point where one can speak of large-scale atheization, but also of a consolidation of the "religious elite." That is, the research done by Srdjan Vrcan in Dalmatia shows that in those secondary school students who have a firm tie to religion this tie becomes still stronger after they go to the university.

The most recent research of Dr Stefica Baktarijevic, sociologist of religion, also confirms that the percentage of religious young people is dropping: comparing figures for 1969 and 1983 for the same age group (between the ages of 18 and 27) for the same area (the Zagreb region) and for the same composition of respondents, it is obvious that religious faith is declining.

<u>Inclination of Young People</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1983</u>	<u>Inclination of Young People</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1983</u>
Religious	40	26	Unreligious	21	23
Uncommitted	23	22	Atheist	15	29

It is interesting that among young people there is no statistically significant difference between the sexes with respect to religious faith (the stereotype would have it that women are more religious), nor with respect to place of residence (city, small town, rural). But there are significant differences with respect to occupation and education.

The fact should not be forgotten that a fourth of young people have ties to the church and religion according to their own declaration. It is also evident that some young people, though they do not consider themselves to be believers, do participate in traditional religious rituals.

To what extent can the economic crisis, which is halting social advancement, darkening the future and engendering hopelessness, produce in the "shell-shocked generation" or "superfluous generation," as we more and more frequently refer to those whom until yesterday we called the "Coca-Cola generation," an intensified interest in religion, which still, of course, does not signify a growth of religious faith?

"A Way Out of the Crisis"

Srdjan Vrcan points to the possibility that in the crisis which has taken hold of us some young people are turning to religion and looking to it for a "way out of the crisis."

Dr Dragomir Pantic, who for some 10 years now has been studying the relationship between young people and religion feels that one should be wary of drawing hasty conclusions. In his opinion, it is difficult to make an explicit answer to this question. That kind of assessment requires after all a lengthier period of history.

Are Christ and Che Guevara identified in the minds of some young people? Has Christ taken the place of God in the minds of some religious young people?

The sociologist Ivica Mastruko poses the question of whether in these cases we are dealing with religious worship as a surrogate for personal initiative [licna samodelatnost]?

In his judgment, the scientific research is lacking for all-inclusive answers to these questions. However, Mastruko says that it is "quite evident that whatever religious consciousness there is and wherever it came from, religion on our soil sometimes functionalizes as nationalistic consciousness both in athletic events and at other nonreligious events." In such cases, of course, this scientist emphasizes, fundamental religious beliefs are not being manifested, but are being functionalized.

Ivica Mastruko points out that in some young people religion even serves as an alternative form of culture, and clericalism as a counterculture to the official atheism.

Perhaps we can find the answer to the question of why there are more and more young people in and around the church, primarily in certain smaller towns, in the line of argument of young people themselves. Speaking at a meeting of the Presidium of the Socialist Youth League of Yugoslavia Conference, which was debating the activity of religious communities among young people, Branimir Brkljac (Vojvodina Provincial Committee of the Socialist Youth League) had this to say:

"Every village has its priest, who waits for the schoolchild after school, who comes up to him and listens to him.... But we young people send out literature!

"The priests organize additional instruction, they take care of young people not otherwise cared for, they stretch out their hands to retarded children and handicapped, to those whom almost all others--from local communities on up--will have nothing to do with.

"While the competent and interested parties in Belgrade argue for months about the location of a hospital for treatment of drug abuse, the church takes young addicts by the hand and leads them into its own house....

"In the western parts of our homeland charity kindergartens are springing up; during the power restrictions in the wintertime only the church organized the escorting of little children home from school.... Discussion series, pilgrimages, athletic festivals for young people, inexpensive visits to monasteries.... Disco evenings and athletic contests are already passe.... Incidentally, the year 1985 has been proclaimed the 'Year of the Young' in the Catholic Church."

An Old Record

A large proportion of young people show an evident unfamiliarity with the phenomenon of religion, a lack of the most basic information, an ignorance of church history, mythology and symbolism....

Young people are trying to fill this gap, and it is logical that all this could result in an interest in religion. And then, the offering of information is often accompanied by manipulation.

Nor is the school doing its part of the job--in the textbooks one finds scanty and very often even a debatable theoretical approach to the phenomenon of religion. In one thick textbook on Marxism running to about 150 pages, only half a page was devoted to the phenomenon of religion! Not a word in the school-books about the role of institutionalized religion in the contemporary world, particularly in our society. And when this delicate sphere is discussed in the school, the talk revolves around a few dogmatic phrases concerning "distorted consciousness" and "opium for the people."

The school has obviously not been doing enough so that young people learn more about this rather important sphere of life, as much as is required by our culture, by our civilization, and indeed by our entire social environment.

The amount of interest which young people have in information from this sphere is also shown by many Belgrade discussion series--the University Student Culture Center, the Youth Center, Student City, the School of Natural Sciences and Mathematics at Belgrade University--who in recent months have attracted a sizable young audience when there was discussion of religion and the church. Many people have perhaps concluded hastily that young people are more and more attracted by religion, passing over all of those layers of civilization, culture and history which are of interest to a young person. Young people are especially attracted by religious symbolism and mythology, but the school is silent about this component of art, philosophy, culture and literature which goes back thousands of years.

The school is also silent about national myths, and it devotes two or three general passages in passing by and passing over periods of the past which are not so remote. At the same time, the church is cleverly attempting to take advantage of the increasingly numerous large-scale religious events, dates and personalities in the history of the nationality. This appropriation and interpretation of history and tradition and the entire legacy of the nationality sometimes goes all the way to placing an equals sign between the ethnic and the religious. These dangerous games, the nationalistic outbreaks among young people, are often linked to an intensified activity of the clergy.

Obviously the mosaic for portrayal of "young people and religion" is much more complicated than what one sees in the cathedral on Good Friday.

Young people's greater inquisitiveness about religion, and indeed even their presence in church, should neither be dramatized, nor underestimated.

Otherwise we will be doing the church a great favor.

[Box, pp 18-19]

Why They Go to Church

Specialists of the Belgrade Center for Political Science Research and Public Opinion of the Social Sciences Institute are finishing up a large survey entitled "Contemporary Myths, Rituals and Religious Consciousness of Belgrade and Environs," which will also shed more light on the phenomenon of the relation between young people and religion. The survey included 1,000 respondents in Belgrade and vicinity--a third of them were people between the ages of 15 and 27.

It is interesting that this is the first time that such a comprehensive study of the phenomenon of religion has been organized in Belgrade--until quite recently it was felt that this was a problem which did not deserve much attention.

In response to the direct question "Do you believe in God?" 9 percent of the young people answered affirmatively, 6 percent "no," 15 percent undecided and 11 percent did not wish to answer.

It is interesting that 57 percent of the respondents answered that they never go to church, while according to the results of that same center, some 10 years ago the percentage of young people who did not go to church was considerably higher--88 percent! A third of the respondents (these are young people between the ages of 15 and 27) do go to church, but it should be taken into account that this is just one indicator, the weakest at that, of religious sentiment, stresses Dr Dragomir Pantic, director of this scientific project.

The researchers also put to the young people the question "If you go to church, why do you do it?" Among those who go to church regularly 10 percent answered "to pray and to take part in services," 6 percent "look for consolation," 4 percent "meet friends," 5 percent explained their going to church by the desire to listen to the priest. (Is it possible to speak of the charisma of the priest? The well-informed say that the sermons of Amfilohije Radovic were attended in large part because of his unquestionable oratorical skill.) It is interesting that all of 15 percent of these young men and women say that they go to church for "esthetic reasons" (because of the atmosphere, the music ...); 3 percent of the respondents go to church "out of spite and protest," and then there come others as well: for example, for recreation (this activity is especially widespread in the Catholic Church)....

It might be concluded from the answers to this question that going to church for young people is primarily an esthetic event, but to some extent also camouflaged expression [mimikrija] of certain dissatisfactions of the "superfluous generation."

The researchers of the Center for Political Science Research were rather surprised by the answers to the question "If you were in trouble, would you go to the priest for help?"--43 percent of the respondents answered affirmatively, 36 percent negatively, and one-fifth chose the answer "don't know."

Although all the data of this comprehensive research have not yet been processed, we asked the supervisor of this scientific project, Dr Dragomir Pantic, to comment on some of the indicators. In Dr Pantic's opinion, some of the indicators show that the very rapid trend toward erosion of religious consciousness has quite certainly been halted. In his judgment, even reversible processes are possible.

Let us repeat, in the opinion of this scientist, it is too early to draw conclusions about whether young people are turning to religion in this time of crisis. As Dr Pantic puts it, a longer period of history is after all necessary to make such a judgment. He told us that he sees the larger number of young people in churches as a part of the picture concerning the alternative way of life of the young generation, but also as a result of curiosity about subject matter that in school and indeed even more widely is either not mentioned or is spoken about in generality.

NIN reporter Dragan Jovanovic recorded that in the cathedral on Good Friday, when there was a procession of several thousand Belgraders, anyone who knows anything about Christian rites could easily see that many of the young men and women were in the church for the first time. Nor did the young people conceal this: they asked how one crossed oneself, how many days the fasting lasted for Easter, what was behind the iconostasis.... They pushed up closer to the iconostasis in order to see better what the priests were doing "when there was that groovy smell." One girl in punk dress, tired from being up so late, sat down in the chair intended for the patriarch, which scandalized some of the zealous older believers....

But Dr Pantic explains the fact that the churches are full with the fact that the number of inhabitants in Belgrade had increased many times over, but new churches have not been built....

[Box, p 20]

Forty Religious Communities

Speaking about the need for a public debate about the activity of the religious community and about the tasks of the Socialist Alliance, a topic which was not motivated by "particular events" or excesses(!), Branko Puharic called attention in a recent meeting of the Croatian Republic Conference of the SAWP to certain figures: since the end of the war more than 300 church structures of various faiths have been built or are under construction, and more than 1,000 structures have been rebuilt or redone. In SR [Socialist Republic] Croatia alone religious communities publish more than 130 newspapers, and the total circulation of the religious press in Yugoslavia is estimated at about 15 million copies.

In any case, in Yugoslavia there are more than 40 active religious communities, and there are about 20,000 priests or equivalent religious officials working in them. Future priests are educated in 30 secondary religious schools, 8 at the junior postsecondary level, 11 at the senior postsecondary level (the cornerstone was laid for a new seminary in Belgrade recently), and several specialized institutes.

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DATE FILMED

25 Sept. 1984